La Modernizzazione Militare della Cina nel Contesto della Sua Grande Strategia

Abstract

This thesis examines China’s military modernization as a central pillar of its grand strategy, analyzing how the People’s Liberation Army has become a strategic instrument and what this implies for U.S.-China competition and regional security. It argues that modernization is not a narrow technical process but a deliberate form of statecraft linking national rejuvenation, power projection, and systemic rivalry. Drawing on doctrinal texts, budget and force structure data, and case studies of peacekeeping, counter-piracy, and exercises, the study situates military reform within broader strategic aims. The first part develops the grand strategy foundation, showing how Party leaders align ends, ways, and means by embedding mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization into a narrative of national strength, regime legitimacy, and comprehensive national power. Building on this, the second part traces doctrinal and institutional changes since the 1990s, including the establishment of joint theater commands, the elevation of space and cyber forces, the promotion of civil-military fusion, and lessons drawn from foreign conflicts. These developments expand PLA options from noncombat tasks to high-intensity joint warfare, with Taiwan as the central planning axis. The third part examines the PLA’s widening external role, covering United Nations peacekeeping, counter-piracy missions, the Djibouti base, and activities in the Middle East, Africa, and the polar regions. Finally, the study assesses how this trajectory recalibrates the security order, where U.S. strategies with allies, a transactional China-Russia alignment, and a more cohesive NATO after Ukraine interact with PLA modernization. Taiwan emerges as the pivotal stress test. The conclusion finds that modernization strengthens deterrence and influence but simultaneously generates security dilemmas, counterstrategies, and persistent vulnerabilities, reshaping both regional and global security dynamics

This thesis examines China’s military modernization as a central pillar of its grand strategy, analyzing how the People’s Liberation Army has become a strategic instrument and what this implies for U.S.-China competition and regional security. It argues that modernization is not a narrow technical process but a deliberate form of statecraft linking national rejuvenation, power projection, and systemic rivalry. Drawing on doctrinal texts, budget and force structure data, and case studies of peacekeeping, counter-piracy, and exercises, the study situates military reform within broader strategic aims. The first part develops the grand strategy foundation, showing how Party leaders align ends, ways, and means by embedding mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization into a narrative of national strength, regime legitimacy, and comprehensive national power. Building on this, the second part traces doctrinal and institutional changes since the 1990s, including the establishment of joint theater commands, the elevation of space and cyber forces, the promotion of civil-military fusion, and lessons drawn from foreign conflicts. These developments expand PLA options from noncombat tasks to high-intensity joint warfare, with Taiwan as the central planning axis. The third part examines the PLA’s widening external role, covering United Nations peacekeeping, counter-piracy missions, the Djibouti base, and activities in the Middle East, Africa, and the polar regions. Finally, the study assesses how this trajectory recalibrates the security order, where U.S. strategies with allies, a transactional China-Russia alignment, and a more cohesive NATO after Ukraine interact with PLA modernization. Taiwan emerges as the pivotal stress test. The conclusion finds that modernization strengthens deterrence and influence but simultaneously generates security dilemmas, counterstrategies, and persistent vulnerabilities, reshaping both regional and global security dynamics