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NATO MISSIONS AND LEFT-WING PARTIES IN 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY:  
THE CASE OF ITALY AND SPAIN

War, conflicts and peace

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# NATO MISSIONS AND LEFT-WING PARTIES IN 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY. THE CASE OF ITALY AND SPAIN.

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# INTRODUCTION

How did the centre-left and left parties in Italy and Spain vote for international missions in the post 9/11 global scenario? Are the positions of these parties changed according to the type of mission and to being in government or opposition?

This thesis will try to answer these two questions.

The first chapter helps the reader in understanding the issues of the thesis: it is divided in three paragraphs, the first related to the internal organization – both political and military – of the Atlantic Alliance and an historical overview of the missions; then there is a part on the positions of the main leftist parties regarding NATO, not only from Italy and Spain but also from other important member States as the US Democrats, the British Labour, the SPD and the French Socialists; finally, since this thesis is about the votes made in Parliament, the last paragraph of the first chapter is about the parliamentary war powers, which differs in every NATO member State, from Germany in which the *Bundestag* has a very important role in overseeing the defence policy of the executive to other countries in which the Parliament has a secondary role if compared with the government.

Then, the other two chapters will analyse the foreign and defence policy of the Italian and Spanish left-wing parties in different ways: firstly, looking at the official documents of the various centre-left and left parties as, for example, the electoral manifestos and the public positions on important foreign policy events; this is important for seeing if there is continuity in the parties' platform or if, and how, there are changes.

The second type of analysis is about the main issue of the thesis and a specific tool of foreign policy: the parliamentary votes on NATO missions; finally, there will be interviews with policymakers who, in the opinion of who is writing, could provide an internal – and interesting – point of view.

The choice we made about the countries, Italy and Spain, must be searched in the similar institutional and political system of them: both countries are parliamentary democracies and, for what concerns parties, there is the presence of one main party which is part of the Party of European Socialists (PD in Italy, PSOE in Spain) and other minor formations on the radical left.

Furthermore, those two countries are both middle powers and the foreign policy of both of them is mainly focused on the Mediterranean area.

Regarding the choice of the missions analysed, it was chosen the period after 9/11 because what happened on that day was a turning point in the foreign and defence policies of Western countries (especially the US) and for the Atlantic Alliance: for the first time was invoked the Article 5 of the Treaty, the one on collective defence, which says "*The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and*

*consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”* and, after that, NATO started to deploy troops in missions in Middle East, out of the historical area of competence of it, the North Atlantic one. These are the causes for why the writer decided to make the thesis on this precise issue, the votes of leftist parties in Italy and Spain on NATO missions after 2001.

# LEFT-WING PARTIES AND INTERNATIONAL MISSIONS

## *NATO MISSIONS: HISTORY AND DIFFERENCES*

Since this thesis is about the vote of left-wing parties on NATO missions, it is important to make a general introduction of NATO<sup>1</sup>.

NATO, which the complete name is North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is an international organization and a military alliance born after the Second World War, in 1949, after an agreement reached by the countries of the so called “western block”; the founding members were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom and United States.

Nowadays, NATO passes from the founding 12 member States to the actual 30 members; the process of the enlargement of NATO started very early, in the 50s with the addition of Greece and Turkey in 1952 and the one of West Germany in 1955. Spain, the other country – with Italy – which we focused on this thesis, joined the Alliance in 1982, after the end of Franchist regime and the democratic transition.

Even if the North Atlantic Treaty was signed and NATO was created at the start of the Cold War, this survived the fall of the USSR and communist system of eastern Europe and after 1991 we can see the continuation of enlargement process, with some countries previously part of the eastern block and of the Warsaw Pact<sup>2</sup> - like Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia and the three Baltic republics – that decided to join the Alliance.

The entrance of new member States is ruled by article 10 of the Treaty<sup>3</sup>, which says that:

*“The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.”*

In this article it is important to underline the geographic aspect, only European States can join the Alliance, and the predominant role given to the United States, designated as depository of the possible requests of accession.

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.nato.int>

<sup>2</sup> The Warsaw Pact was a military alliance signed between USSR and the other countries of the eastern bloc in 1955

<sup>3</sup> NATO - Official text: The North Atlantic Treaty, 04-Apr.-1949

NATO structure<sup>4</sup> is double: in fact, there are both political and military structures<sup>5</sup>.

The political structure includes three institutions: the Parliamentary Assembly, which is formed by MPs delegations of member States and has the aim of implement the intraparlamentarian dialogue on security and defence issues; the second political institution is the North Atlantic Council, formed by permanent delegates and sometimes with the participation of Head of Government/State, Foreign affair secretary or Defence secretary of the member States; the Council is led by the Secretary General, who has to be European and represent the Alliance all over the world<sup>6</sup>.

The headquarters of NATO political structure is in Bruxelles.

In Bruxelles there is also the headquarter of the Military Committee, the main organism of the military structure which is formed by representatives of each member States' Army and has the role of deciding the guidelines of military policies of the Alliance; this committee is guided by a Chair, chosen between Chiefs of Defence of member States<sup>7</sup>.

The Military Committee most important task is to coordinate the Allied Command Transformation (ACT), which is in Norfolk, Virginia (US) and is responsible for analysis, formation, planning of future strategies, and the Allied Command Operation (ACO), in Mons, Belgium, which is related to the military operations on the ground.

Looking more specifically at NATO missions, we have to divide in several periods the role the Alliance played in the international ground.

From 1949 since early 90s, during the Cold War, NATO was never involved in military operations on the ground, having primarily a role of deterrence against the communist block; during this period the United States were involved in two major conflicts, the Korean and the Vietnam wars, but without the support of the Alliance.

The first military operation involving NATO was called "Anchor Guard" and started on August 10<sup>th</sup>, 1990, eight days after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The aim of this operation is to monitor the situation and be ready of proving help to Turkey in case of Iraqi attack against it; 7 aircrafts and 9 crews were involved in Operation Anchor Guard<sup>8</sup>.

In January 1991, NATO launched another mission in the area "Operation Ace Guard", deploying part of the air defence packages in Turkey after Turkish government's request. Both "Anchor Guard" and "Ace Guard" ended in March 1991 after the end of Gulf War and the restoration of Kuwait sovereignty.

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<sup>4</sup> [https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index\\_it.html#](https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index_it.html#)

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/structure.htm#MS>

<sup>6</sup> Since Oct. 1st, 2014, Jens Stoltenberg (Norway) is NATO SG

<sup>7</sup> Since Jun. 25th, 2021, Admiral Rob Bauer (Netherlands) is Chair of NATO Military Committee

<sup>8</sup> Operation Anchor Guard – Great Norwegian Encyclopedia (snl.no)

In the first months of 1992, NATO started two different operations<sup>9</sup>: “Allied Goodwill”, between February and March of that year, for guaranteed humanitarian assistance and medical advisors to Russia and other CSI countries, and “Agile Genie”, in May 1992, for covering Central Mediterranean Sea after a period of tensions between western countries and Libya.

Surely, the first big scenario in which NATO was involved was in the Balkans, where after Tito’s death the central government of Yugoslavia faced independentism in all the republics that were part of the Federation.

Even if the first republics that decided to declare independency were Croatia and Slovenia, on the 25<sup>th</sup> of June 1991, the situation escalated when independentist impulses raised also in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In September 1991 and May 1992, the United Nations Security Council adopted two resolutions, the first one (713) imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia, the second one (757) imposed a general embargo; after these – and also others – resolutions, there was a NATO foreign ministers meeting on July 10<sup>th</sup>, 1992 in which was decided to help UN in monitoring the respect of these resolutions.

Few days later, on July 16<sup>th</sup> started operation “Maritime Monitor”<sup>10</sup>, with the deployment of NATO ships in international waters in front of Montenegro; this operation finished in November 1992, with the start of “Maritime Guard”<sup>11</sup>.

This operation aimed to follow the UNSC resolution 787, that enforced the embargo and authorized NATO to use force if necessary and to stop and inspect all ships coming from Yugoslavia.

During this operation, that finished on June 15<sup>th</sup>, 1993, more than 12.000 ships were contacted, 1.032 inspected and 9 were found to be in violation of UN embargo.

When “Maritime Guard” finished, the naval blockade was still guaranteed with Operation “Guard Sharp”, which ended in 1996 and, according to NATO officials, this naval blockade had a major effect in preventing escalation of the conflict<sup>12</sup>.

Contextually to these naval missions, there were also operations regarding the airspace of Yugoslavia, “Sky Monitor” and “Deny Flight”.

Operation Sky Monitor started in October 1992, after a UNSC resolution (781), in which the Security Council expressed concerns about the use of Bosnian airspace for war scope by Yugoslavia and asked to ban military flights in it; since then, NATO aircrafts that were still in the area because of “Maritime Monitor” started to monitor the respect of this sort of no-fly zone.

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<sup>9</sup> NATO - Topic: Operations and missions: past and present

<sup>10</sup> Operation Maritime Monitor (globalsecurity.org)

<sup>11</sup> Operation Maritime Guard (globalsecurity.org)

<sup>12</sup> Bellamy C., "Naval blockade lifts in Adriatic" in The Independent. (June 20, 1996)



In April 1993, when this mission finished, there were, according to NATO, more than 500 violations of the no-fly zone, by both sides of the conflicts.

“Sky Monitor” was substituted with a new operation called “Deny Flight”; this new mission followed the escalation of the conflict and UNSC resolution 816, which ban not only military flights – as it was previously – but all flights.

The first aim of “Deny Flight” was only to enforce the no-fly zone, but soon the possibility to enlarge the role of NATO actions was considered by an increasing number of top officials, especially in the US.

In June 1993, was approved UNSC resolution 836<sup>13</sup> that gave authorization to NATO to provide close air support for the UN forces on the ground of UNPROFOR missions if they required it and after some months, in February 1994 there was the first combat engagement in the history of the Alliance. “Deny Flight” was placed side by side with another operation, “Deliberate Force”, after the killing of 37 people into a Sarajevo marketplace in August 1993. US accused Serbian forces for the attack and consequently NATO launched airstrikes against Serb military targets in August and September. During this operation, “Deny Flight” remained still active until December 1995, after the signature of Dayton Accords, that ended the Bosnian war; the majority of the forces deployed in this mission remained to provide support to IFOR (Implementation Force), a peacekeeping operation in Bosnia composed by 32 countries, even non-NATO ones.

In 1996, IFOR was ended and substituted by SFOR (Stabilization Force), which aim was to stabilize peace<sup>14</sup> in the area, this was a 39-countries mission (7 more than IFOR) and it was replaced by EU’s EUFOR Althea on December 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2004. On this day, after twelve years, NATO left Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The international stage, and consequently the role of NATO, changed after 9/11 terrorist attacks against US: the UN Security Council adopted a resolution in which it expressed sympathy to the United States<sup>15</sup> and the NATO Council invoked, for the first time since the born of the Alliance, the article 5<sup>16</sup>.

The Bush presidency started the so-called War on terror attacking Afghanistan in 2001 and, two years later, Iraq.

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<sup>13</sup> Beale M., (1997). Bombs over Bosnia: The Role of Airpower in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery: Air University Press.

<sup>14</sup> <https://www.nato.int/sfor/organisation/mission.htm>

<sup>15</sup> <https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/SC7143.doc.htm>

<sup>16</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm>

The Alliance started operating in Afghanistan on December 20<sup>th</sup>, 2001, with the beginning of ISAF<sup>17</sup> (International Security Assistance Force) mission, in which were involved more than 50 thousand soldiers from both NATO and Non-NATO countries.

The principal aim of the mission was to protect Kabul and the airbase of Bagram from Al Qaeda and the Taliban, an islamist group that governed the country from 1996 to 2001, considered by the US government as protector of terrorists and, after their military defeat<sup>18</sup> in 2001, substituted with a transition government led by Hamid Karzai.

This mission ended in 2014 and was followed by Resolute Support, which started on 1/1/2015; during this mission, the forces on the ground trained and assisted local forces<sup>19</sup>, in the prevision of a western withdrawal from the country.

The main difference between ISAF and RS is that in the second mission soldiers were not allowed to use force unless they were attacked by enemies<sup>20</sup>.

The presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan ended in 2021<sup>21</sup>, with a dramatic withdrawal and the return of the Taliban in charge, with the western public opinion asking how was possible that, after years of training and billionaire costs, the Afghan army was defeated in few weeks and the resistance of the Afghan Republic against Taliban insurrection was so weak.

In 2003, US invaded Iraq to overturn the regime of Saddam Hussein, Iraqi President since 1979; the military action was conducted by a 49 countries multinational coalition called “coalition of the willing”<sup>22</sup>, but without important US allies and NATO members like France and Germany.

In the country, NATO was present from 2004 to 2011 with a support operation called “NATO Training Mission in Iraq” (NTM-I), its principal aim was training to help Iraq establish effective and accountable security forces<sup>23</sup>.

In the same year of the finish of NTM-I, the Alliance was involved in another conflict: the one in Libya where, following the protests against the Gheddafi regime in the country in February 2011, the UNSC adopted resolutions 1970 and 1973 "*condemning the gross and systematic violation of human rights*".

These resolutions introduced active measures including a no-fly zone, an arms embargo and the authorisation for member countries, acting as appropriate through regional organisations, to take "*all necessary measures*" to protect Libyan civilians.

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<sup>17</sup> <http://www.nato.int/isaf/index.html>

<sup>18</sup> Operation Enduring Freedom

<sup>19</sup> [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_113694.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_113694.htm?selectedLocale=en)

<sup>20</sup> [https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/us/politics/in-secret-obama-extends-us-role-in-afghan-combat.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/us/politics/in-secret-obama-extends-us-role-in-afghan-combat.html?_r=0)

<sup>21</sup> <https://www.joint-forces.com/world-news/42637-nato-resolute-support-mission-is-ending>

<sup>22</sup> <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/iraq/news/20030327-10.html>

<sup>23</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_52060.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm)

Initially, NATO enforced the no-fly zone and then, on 31 March 2011, NATO took over sole command<sup>24</sup> and control of all military operations for Libya.

The NATO-led Operation “Unified Protector” had three distinct components:

the enforcement of an arms embargo on the high seas of the Mediterranean to prevent the transfer of arms, related material and mercenaries to Libya; the enforcement of a no-fly-zone to prevent any aircraft from bombing civilian targets; air and naval strikes against those military forces involved in attacks or threats to attack Libyan civilians and civilian-populated areas.

The UN mandate was carried out to the letter and the operation was terminated on 31 October 2011 after having fulfilled its objectives<sup>25</sup>.

Those were the most important NATO missions in the past, nowadays the Alliance is still engaged in several operations in the Mediterranean area, in Iraq, in Africa and in the Baltics<sup>26</sup>.

As we said before, during 90s the former Yugoslavia was crossed by war, the most difficult front wasn't only Bosnia but also Kosovo, where a major part of the population is Albanian and, because of this, persecuted by Serb government.

Since 1999 was active the mission “Kosovo Force” (KFOR)<sup>27</sup>; this mission was authorized UNSC resolution 1244 that established an international mandate over the Region and is still active now, with the aim of stabilizing the area in which there are still hidden ethnic tensions between Albanians and Serbs, which never recognized the declaration of independence of 2008. The international recognition of Kosovo is made only by 98 UN countries of 193.

Nowadays, KFOR is a 27 countries operation with more than 3000 effectives<sup>28</sup>, considering both military and civil personnel.

In Mediterranean Sea the Alliance is involved in another mission “Sea Guardian”<sup>29</sup> active since 2016; this operation is currently helping to maintain a secure and safe maritime environment while supporting the Alliance's three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.

This isn't the first operation with these goals: right after 9/11, in October 2001, NATO launched the maritime surveillance Operation “Active Endeavour”, focused on detecting and deterring terrorist activity in the Mediterranean.

The operation was terminated in October 2016 with the start of “Sea Guardian”.

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<sup>24</sup> [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_71867.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_71867.htm)

<sup>25</sup> [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_71652.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_71652.htm)

<sup>26</sup> NATO - Topic: Operations and missions: past and present

<sup>27</sup> <https://jfcnaples.nato.int/kfor>

<sup>28</sup> [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/6/pdf/2020-06-KFOR-Placemat.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/6/pdf/2020-06-KFOR-Placemat.pdf)

<sup>29</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_136233.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136233.htm)

Returning in Middle East, in July 2018 the Iraqi government requested, in coordination with the Global Coalition against Daesh, the support of the Alliance and during a summit held in Brussels the leaders of NATO countries decided to start the “NATO mission Iraq”<sup>30</sup>: similar to NMT-I, this mission is a non-combat training and capacity building one, helping Iraqi security forces to be ready to new military engagement if there will be return of ISIL terrorists.

At the current times, one of the most interesting zone of action of the Alliance is in northern Europe, in the Baltics: after the collapse of the USSR the three Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) joined NATO in 2004, causing Russia’s irritation because since then, for the first time in history, NATO is at its border<sup>31</sup>.

In these countries the Alliance is making different missions of Air policing<sup>32</sup>, that have the goal of safeguarding airspace sovereignty; but other Air policing missions are currently active in Iceland, Benelux, and Western Balkans<sup>33</sup>.

Finally, NATO is cooperating with the African Union<sup>34</sup> in its peacekeeping missions on the African continent with common training, operational support and structural assistance.

The Alliance also opened a liaison office in AU headquarter in Addis Abeba, to empower the cooperation between these two organizations.

This is a general overview on NATO missions and operations all over the years; we could assume that – even if the Alliance was created against the Soviet bloc – almost the totality of these were done after the collapse of the USSR, and we could also see that – even if the name was related to north Atlantic – the majority of these operations were conducted in other areas of the world, like the Middle East and the Mediterranean area.

## *THE POSITION OF LEFTIST PARTIES ON THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE*

It is common opinion that leftist parties are more related to pacifist movements and, consequently, against NATO and United States defence and foreign policy.

Nevertheless, even if we simplify the political spectre just considering right and left, we have to underline the differences within “left”: the general trend, looking parties’ positions about joining the Alliance and then parliamentary votes on single missions, is that radical left parties (for ex.

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<sup>30</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_166936.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_166936.htm)

<sup>31</sup> Le tensioni tra Nato e Russia sul fronte baltico (affarinternazionali.it)

<sup>32</sup> NATO: l’Italia impegnata nella missione di Air Policing sul Baltico - Europa Atlantica

<sup>33</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_132685.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132685.htm)

<sup>34</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_8191.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8191.htm)

communists) support weakly the Alliance, as the support increases when we shift to centre-left parties. This is the so-called curvilinear model<sup>35</sup>.

Looking at some specific cases of leftist parties' position on NATO, we started with the countries studied in this thesis, Italy and Spain.

As we said before, Italy was one of the founding members of the Alliance in 1949; the ratification of the Treaty, signed the 4<sup>th</sup> of April, was preceded by a tense political and parliamentary debate<sup>36</sup>.

Both Italian Communist Party (PCI) and Italian Socialist Party (PSI)<sup>37</sup> were against the Italian entrance in the Alliance, expressing concerns about the real aim of NATO, an aggressive policy against the Soviet bloc that would, quoting PSI secretary On. Pietro Nenni “destroy the collective security system”<sup>38</sup>.

De Gasperi, Italian PM, was accused of putting Italy at US service and leftist parties were also worried about the possible use of military bases for engaging NATO operations<sup>39</sup>, after his replies<sup>40</sup> at the end of parliamentary debate, he underlined the importance for the Country to join the Alliance and to stay in the western block under this military pact, a preventive measure for guaranteeing peace and against Stalin policies, worrying for Europe.

After this huge debate, both chambers approved government resolution, with the vote of DC, Liberal Party and Republican Party.

After 1949, in the following decades, the PSI started to change its foreign policy. The breakup with USSR and Italian communists happened in 1956, after Soviet invasion of Hungary which PSI strongly condemned: Pietro Nenni said “we will give all our support to Hungarians so that they could make socialism in democracy, freedom and independency”<sup>41</sup>; because of this declaration, he was accused of treason by PCI and the left popular front between these two parties, at the national level, was dissolved.

PCI, which remained close to USSR during Hungarian crisis when the general secretary was Palmiro Togliatti, started to move off from the Soviet Union in 1968, when the new secretary Luigi Longo expressed solidarity to Alexander Dubcek and his reforms during the period known as Prague's Spring.

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<sup>35</sup> Wagner, W., Herranz-Surrallés, A., Kaarbo, J., & Ostermann, F. (2018). Party politics at the water's edge: Contestation of military operations in Europe. *European Political Science Review*, 10(4), 537-563

<sup>36</sup> <https://www.ilmediano.com/LA-STORIA-IN-PILLOLE-1949-LITALIA-ENTRA-NELLA-NATO/>

<sup>37</sup> Contro l'adesione alla NATO – Appello al Popolo

<sup>38</sup> La Politica, ieri e oggi L'adesione italiana alla Nato. Il futuro sindaco Masciale contro il patto di guerra - Politica - Una finestra sempre aperta su Bitonto - DaBitonto

<sup>39</sup> L'Unità, 15/03/1949

<sup>40</sup> [democraticicristiani.com](https://www.democraticicristiani.com/) - "I discorsi di De Gasperi in Parlamento nel dibattito per l'adesione dell'Italia alla NATO"

<sup>41</sup> Le dichiarazioni della sinistra sulla Rivoluzione Ungherese - iStorica

However, the major shock in the relationship between Italian communists and USSR happened in 1976, when the new PCI leader Enrico Berlinguer told in an interview that he “felt safer under NATO umbrella”<sup>42</sup>, causing angry reactions in the Soviet Union but also in the most radical area of his party. After the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and, two years later, the collapse of the Soviet Union PCI no longer existed and was substituted by the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) and Communist Refoundation (PRC).

PDS, since 1998 named DS, joined the Socialist International<sup>43</sup> and the Party of European Socialists<sup>44</sup>, following a foreign policy more western-oriented; on the contrary, PRC was composed by the minoritarian filo-sovietic area of former PCI and declared in its statute<sup>45</sup> the party is against every form of imperialism, as it defines US and NATO foreign policy.

In 2007 DS unified themselves with the centrist party La Margherita in the new Democratic Party (PD), which values’ manifesto says that there is “the necessity of reinforcing and renewing international and multilateral institutions”<sup>46</sup>, showing that this new party strongly supported IOs like UN, UE and NATO and has a foreign policy that could be defined “atlantist”. We will discuss more in depth the foreign and defence policy of Italian left in chapter 2.

The other country analysed in this thesis is Spain, which entered in the Alliance in the 80s, after the end of franchist dictatorship when centre-right UCD party was in government.

Until 1979 Socialist workers party (PSOE), the main leftist party in the country continued to follow Marxist ideology and was, consequently, against NATO; after the abandon of radicalism and the shift to social democracy also its position towards the Atlantic Alliance changed.

After the general elections of 1982<sup>47</sup> where PSOE reached the majority in the *Cortes generales* and socialist leader Felipe Gonzalez became Prime Minister and, after the agreement on some terms like the “non-nuclearization” and the reduction of US troops presence in Spain<sup>48</sup>, his government decided to hold a referendum on the remaining of the Country in the Alliance. The referendum took place in 1986 and 56% of votes were in favour of continuing to be NATO member State<sup>49</sup>.

This huge change in PSOE policy led to confusion and disorientation in socialist electorate, specially with the leftist part of it<sup>50</sup>; symbol of this was Javier Solana, that was firstly against NATO – he wrote

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<sup>42</sup> E Berlinguer mi disse: «Preferisco la Nato a Varsavia» - Corriere.it

<sup>43</sup> Caprara M., *Il PDS nell'Internazionale, freddo il sì di Craxi*, in *Corriere della Sera*, 10 settembre 1992, p. 7

<sup>44</sup> *L'Unione Socialista CEE 'SI' al PDS*, in *la Repubblica*, 21 ottobre 1992, p. 5

<sup>45</sup> [statutoXcongressoGU\\_prc.pdf](#) (rifondazione.it)

<sup>46</sup> Manifesto dei Valori - Partito Democratico

<sup>47</sup> <https://www.historiaelectoral.com/e1982.html>

<sup>48</sup> Rodrigo Luelmo F.J., (2016), *The accession of Spain to NATO*

<sup>49</sup> [http://www.congreso.es/consti/elecciones/referendos/ref\\_otan.htm](http://www.congreso.es/consti/elecciones/referendos/ref_otan.htm)

<sup>50</sup> La Spagna nella NATO: dall’opposizione alla presidenza (cafebabel.com)

a pamphlet called “50 reasons to say no to NATO”, then in 1986 supported the remain in the referendum and finally he became Secretary General of the Alliance between 1995 and 1999.

As well as for Italian leftist parties after 2001, also for Spanish ones their foreign and defence policies will be discuss later, in the third chapter of this thesis.

Looking at other leftist parties in NATO countries, the most important is maybe the Democratic Party in the US.

US Democrats were in power in 1949, when the Atlantic treaty was signed: US President was Harry Truman, theorist of the homonym doctrine that supported freedom and independence of European States under the Soviet threat, this theory was conceived after Greek civil war and Soviet pressions on Turkey and was the basis of NATO aim.

Democrats’ foreign policy in last decades tended to internationalism and multilateralism<sup>51</sup>, and even today, especially after the neo isolationist policies of Republicans and Donald Trump, they strongly reaffirm that position. In 2020 presidential campaign, an important part of the political manifesto of Joe Biden and Kamala Harris, edited during the National Convention, was about “renewing American leadership”<sup>52</sup>. In this document, Democrats accused Donald Trump of weakened US alliances and he has undermined confidence in America’s commitment to Article 5 mutual defence provision and threatened to pull troops out of Germany without consultation.

Democrats also affirmed that with the new administration they will reinvent alliances to advance mutual priorities and deal with new global challenges.

From this document, which is the Democratic party platform for next years, we can assume that still nowadays the main position in this party is favourable to NATO, even if in recent years – since 2016 presidential primaries – became relevant the position of the socialist area, lead by Bernie Sanders, which despite being favourable to NATO, is against its expansion to eastern Europe, seen as an unnecessary provocation to Russia<sup>53</sup>.

Finally, not only within all the Democrats but also between them and Republicans, even if with two different approaches, is common opinion in the US that European allies must pay more for funding NATO: Each member country has pledged to contribute 2% of their GDP to fund the NATO operations but only 7 of the 29 countries in the Alliance are meeting this target<sup>54</sup>.

This is a very important issue for politicians of both parties in US, the most important country of the Alliance.

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<sup>51</sup> Democratic Party - Policy and structure | Britannica

<sup>52</sup> RENEWING AMERICAN LEADERSHIP - Democrats

<sup>53</sup> Bernie Sanders on NATO (feelthebern.org)

<sup>54</sup> <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/14/politics/nato-defense-spending-target/index.html>

Coming back to Europe, the most important leftist parties are UK labour, French socialists and German SPD.

It was under the first government of Clement Attlee, leader of the Labour Party, that United Kingdom joined NATO as founding member<sup>55</sup>; even during Attlee and Harold Wilson governments, both considered as radical ones rather than moderate, the Country continued maintaining its “special relation” with the United States.

With the nomination of Tony Blair as Secretary general, the party changed its ideological connotation abandoning the historical positions of the left, promoting a moderate agenda for the “New Labour”. This position, distinguished from classic social democratic policies and right-wing liberalism, was defined “third way”<sup>56</sup>.

In the General elections of 1997 Labour returned in Downing Street after 18 years and Tony Blair became British PM; in his political manifesto<sup>57</sup> he reaffirmed the importance of NATO for Britain defence, that had some new threats to face as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the growth of ethnic nationalism and extremism, international terrorism, and crime and drug trafficking.

Blair and its New Labour thought that UK should have an important role as global leader and, consequently, they reaffirmed strong commitment not only to the Alliance but also in others international organizations as UN, where UK is a permanent member of Security Council.

An important turning point for Blair was related to foreign policy and his project of Britain as global leader, its decision to support US in the Iraq War in 2003, that caused him loss of political support<sup>58</sup> even in his own party, especially from a pacifist and socialist Labour MP for Islington North, Jeremy Corbyn, which spoke against Blair’s government during anti-Iraq war protest<sup>59</sup>.

Blair and his successor, Gordon Brown, led the party and the Country until 2011. Since then, Conservative gained majority in the House of Commons relegating Labour to opposition and, within Labour, their positions were progressively abandoned by the militants, who elected Jeremy Corbyn as Secretary in 2015, but remained still strong in the parliamentary group, that fought Corbyn and his agenda in his four-year term as Leader of the Opposition and Shadow PM.

Corbyn was Labour Secretary until 2019, when he resigned after the electoral loss; the political manifesto of these elections is the latest official document in which we can read the foreign and defence policy of Labour<sup>60</sup>.

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<sup>55</sup> Lee S.J., *Aspects of British Political History 1914–1995* (1996)

<sup>56</sup> third way | History & Features | Britannica

<sup>57</sup> <http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1997/1997-labour-manifesto.shtml>

<sup>58</sup> <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,745536,00.html>

<sup>59</sup> Jeremy Corbyn's 2003 Anti-Iraq War Speech Reminds Us Where Labour Leader Has Always Stood | HuffPost UK News ([huffingtonpost.co.uk](http://huffingtonpost.co.uk))

<sup>60</sup> [Real-Change-Labour-Manifesto-2019.pdf](#)



The manifesto said that international peace and security is a primary objective, ending the Conservative approach defined as “reckless and outsourced to US President” who, in 2019, was Donald J. Trump.

Labour underlined the necessity to introduce a War Powers Act to ensure that no Prime Minister can bypass Parliament to commit to conventional military action; that should be always the *extrema ratio*, prioritising conflict prevention; furthermore, is important for Labour to use UK global influence to end the ‘bomb first, talk later’ approach.

Regarding NATO, in this 2019 electoral program was reaffirmed the British commitment to NATO and to spend at least 2% of GDP on defence.

As we have seen, the political positions of Labour about NATO commitment were similar in all the areas even if with significative differences about single military engagements as Iraq and Libya<sup>61</sup>.

After Corbyn resignations, was elected Leader of the party Sir Keir Starmer, a politician less radical than Corbyn.

In France, the modern Socialist Party was founded 52 years ago, in 1969, eleven years after the born of the Fifth Republic; before that year, there was a socialist movement called SFIO (Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière)<sup>62</sup> that, after World War II, adopted a reformist agenda and was at government in the alliance called Third Force in 1949, when France signed NATO treaty.

Under De Gaulle’s presidency, France decided to withdraw from NATO because the President thought that there was the possibility of sovereign loss.

During Balkan wars, France nominated an ambassador in the military committee and in 2009, under Sarkozy’s presidency, returned to be a member of the Alliance<sup>63</sup>.

The political scenario, at the time this thesis is written, is in change because in April 2022 will be held the presidential elections. The socialist’s candidate Anne Hidalgo, mayor of Paris, and in the polls are estimated around 5% of the votes<sup>64</sup>.

In their electoral manifesto, we first find the word NATO<sup>65</sup> in the last pages, in which is affirmed that Socialist Party wanted to improve military capabilities of EU, talking about strategic autonomy<sup>66</sup>.

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<sup>61</sup> Libya and the suspicious rush to war | Jeremy Corbyn | The Guardian

<sup>62</sup> French Section of the Workers’ International

<sup>63</sup> La Francia ritorna nel comando Nato - Corriere della Sera

<sup>64</sup> POLITICO Poll of Polls — French polls, trends and election news for France – POLITICO

<sup>65</sup> In French, OTAN

<sup>66</sup> Le projet : « Il est temps de mieux vivre » - Parti Socialiste (parti-socialiste.fr)

Is important to underline that NATO was considered, by a lot of French politicians, in a negative way. Not only radicals of left and right like Melenchon<sup>67</sup> and Le Pen<sup>68</sup>, but was also attacked by President Macron, generally considered as a moderate, which defined the Alliance as “brain dead”<sup>69</sup>.

In Germany, SPD returned first party in the general elections of September 2021 and its leader, Olaf Scholz, became German Chancellor in a coalition with FDP (liberal democratic party) and Greens. In the electoral program of SPD<sup>70</sup> the Atlantic Alliance is defined as “a mainstay of the transatlantic partnership and is indispensable for Europe's security”; together with the maintenance of NATO, German social democrats have the ambition to increase European cooperation in the field of defence policy.

Like other European socialists' parties, during 90s and in early 00s even German SPD followed the so called “third way” led by Tony Blair, at that time UK prime minister, when Gerard Schröder was Chancellor<sup>71</sup>, even if in foreign policy, after 9/11 terrorists attack, Schröder was one of the main opponent against the decision of Blair and Bush to attack Iraq, declaring that Germany would not take part to those military operations without a clear UN mandate<sup>72</sup>.

Even if with some domestic policy difference, is it possible to say that every SPD leadership was in favour of NATO and of a collocation of Germany in the western block.

This was not possible since 1959, year of Bad Godesberg congress<sup>73</sup>. During this congress SPD eliminated all references to Marxism, having a fundamental change in the orientation and goals of the party, even in foreign and defence policy accepting the status of NATO member States of Germany, although originally opposed Germany's 1955 rearmament and entry into NATO.

These are the positions on NATO, nowadays and in the past, of the most important centre-left parties in US and in Europe.

Regarding European parties, the Party of European Socialists (PES), which include the parties analysed in previous pages and all the other social democratic parties in the European Union, published an electoral manifesto<sup>74</sup> before European elections of May 2019, for a stronger Europe even in defence field, while develop common defence, pooling and sharing resources to ensure peace and security, in cooperation with NATO and other international organisations.

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<sup>67</sup> French left rally behind anti-NATO Mélenchon (france24.com)

<sup>68</sup> Marine Le Pen: «Con me la Francia fuori dalla Ue e dalla Nato» - Corriere.it

<sup>69</sup> NATO is suffering 'brain death', argues French president Macron (france24.com)

<sup>70</sup> 202105\_Zukunftsprogramm\_EN.pdf (spd.de)

<sup>71</sup> Hooper J., "Schroeder faces day of reckoning", *The Guardian*, 30 May 2003

<sup>72</sup> <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/schroeders-klarstellung-keine-beteiligung-an-irak-feldzug-ohne-uno-mandat-a-187186.html>

<sup>73</sup> Berman, S. (2006). *The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe's Twentieth Century*.

<sup>74</sup> Manifesto 2019 (pes.eu)

The other leftist group in the European Parliament, called “The Left”, which is composed by important parties as Podemos, Die Linke, SYRIZA and La France Insoumise, has different positions on NATO and, more generally, on foreign and defence policy.

This parliamentary group defines NATO as western hemisphere-dominated, anachronistic military alliance<sup>75</sup>, hoping its dissolution.

In these pages we analysed the position of the main leftist parties in NATO countries; is it possible to see, looking at their programmes, that for socialists, labourists and social democrats’ parties there is a shift from initial scepticism to favourable position on the Alliance.

Otherwise, for far-left parties, more linked to anti-Americanism and anti-Imperialism, there is still a strong opposition against NATO and the foreign and defence policy its member States.

### *ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS IN NATO COUNTRIES*

Among NATO countries there are different institutional systems: is it possible to see States ruled by presidentialism like the United States; otherwise, there are semi presidential systems, as in France and finally there are parliamentary republics, as Italy, or even monarchies, as United Kingdom and Spain.

Depending on every system, Parliaments have different power, but – even with some differences – they all have important role regarding foreign and defence policy.

In this paragraph we try to underline the role of Parliaments in NATO countries, analysing differences and similarities between countries and institutional systems.

Starting from the United States, a country in which, despite its presidential system, the Congress has an important role.

The US Congress is composed by two chambers, the House of Representatives, composed by 435 members distributed following States’ population criteria, and the US Senate, composed by 100 members, two for everyone of the 50 States that composed the Union.

The Constitution of the United States gives to the Congress the power of declaring war<sup>76</sup> and if a formal declaration was made against Japan and Germany in World War II, in recent years is it possible to see a different trend, since the House and the Senate adopted resolutions, a different form of congressional action<sup>77</sup>, rather than formal declarations as happened for the Vietnam War, one of the most expensive military engagement in the second half of 20<sup>th</sup> century for the United States, when

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<sup>75</sup> Dissolution of NATO | left

<sup>76</sup> The Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 8

<sup>77</sup> Bills & Resolutions | house.gov

was adopted a resolution that gave to the US President – the Commander in Chief of US Army<sup>78</sup> – the power to take all the necessary measures<sup>79</sup>.

After the end of this war, in which US were defeated, the Congress decided to adopt a resolution with the aim to reduce POTUS' powers in war operations without the approval of Capitol Hill<sup>80</sup>.

This resolution is known as “War Powers Act” and passed by the U.S. Congress on November 7, 1973, over the veto of Richard Nixon, at that time President of the United States<sup>81</sup>.

The aim of this act, or at least the one that was declared during congressional debate about it, is to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of the Armed Forces of the United States in hostilities, or in situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities<sup>82</sup>.

Furthermore, War Powers Act provides that in the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress, the US Armed Forces may be introduced in hostilities, or in situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, only:

- 1) to repel an armed attack upon the United States, its territories and possessions; to take necessary and appropriate retaliatory actions in the event of such an attack; and to forestall the direct and imminent threat of such an attack;
- 2) to repel an armed attack against the Armed Forces of the United States located outside of the United States, its territories and possessions, and to forestall the direct and imminent threat of such an attack;
- 3) to protect while evacuating citizens of the United States, as rapidly as possible, from any country in which such citizens are present with the express or tacit consent of the government of such country, and who are being subject to a direct and imminent threat to their lives, either sponsored by such government or beyond the power of such government to control;
- 4) pursuant to specific statutory authorization, but authority to introduce the Armed Forces of the United States into hostilities shall not be inferred from any provision of law, including any provision contained in any appropriation act, unless such provisions specifically authorized the introduction of such Armed Forces in hostilities and exempts the introduction of such armed forces from compliance with the provisions of this Act<sup>83</sup>.

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<sup>78</sup> The Constitution of the United States, Article 2, Section 2

<sup>79</sup> Risoluzione del Golfo del Tonchino del Congresso degli Stati Uniti (1964) (alphahistory.com)

<sup>80</sup> Karnow S., *Storia della guerra del Vietnam*, Milano, Rizzoli, 1985, p. 506

<sup>81</sup> War Powers Act | History & Facts | Britannica

<sup>82</sup> STATUTE-87-Pg555.pdf (govinfo.gov)

<sup>83</sup> S.440 - 93rd Congress (1973-1974): War Powers Act | Congress.gov | Library of Congress

It also provides that the President has the duty to inform and report within 48 hours the circumstances of hostilities that led to military operations to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate, which are the US highest offices after POTUS.

Not always the War Powers Act has solved the conflicts between the President and the Congress regarding the use of military force: it happened, for example, that Presidents have identified UN or NATO resolutions as justification for military intervention.

This happened in 2011, when President Obama said that, since the US role in Libya was limited and under NATO, there wasn't the necessity of a congressional authorization<sup>84</sup> but on June 3, 2011, the US House of Representatives voted to rebuke President Obama for maintaining US presence in Libya, which they considered a violation of the War Powers Act<sup>85</sup>.

Even under Trump presidency the question of respect of the Act was underlined, after the US missiles strike in Syria of 2017: according to some law professors, this action was against the provisions contained in the Act of 1973<sup>86</sup>.

This was not the only Act adopted by US Congress regarding military operations: other important resolutions were adopted to authorize the President for the use of force.

One is the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)<sup>87</sup>, a joint resolution authorizing the use of the United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the September 11 terrorist attacks. Since 2001, four different Administrations have interpreted their authority under the AUMF to extend beyond al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan to apply to numerous other groups, even though it is not possible to know them because this is still a classified information<sup>88</sup>.

A similar joint resolution, known as Iraq Resolution, but officially "Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq resolution of 2002" was adopted one year later<sup>89</sup>, for authorizing the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. This resolution assumed that is a valid justification to start military actions because of pre-emptive self-defence, but this was, according to former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, illegal and not in conformity with UN Charter<sup>90</sup>.

In conclusion, it is possible to assume that in the United States the role of Congress is very important to control and balance the powers of the federal government, especially the President, that has to be

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<sup>84</sup> <http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2011/05/white-house-on-war-powers-deadline-limited-us-role-in-libya-means-no-need-to-get-congressional-ortho.html>

<sup>85</sup> House Rebukes Obama for Continuing Libyan Mission Without Its Consent - The New York Times (nytimes.com)

<sup>86</sup> Was Trump's Syria strike legal? An expert weighs in - CNNPolitics

<sup>87</sup> Text of S.J.Res. 23 (107th): Authorization for Use of Military Force (Passed Congress version) - GovTrack.us

<sup>88</sup> Unclassified Annex: Report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks for the United States' Use of Military Force and Related National Security Operations | The White House

<sup>89</sup> PLAW-107publ243.pdf (govinfo.gov)

<sup>90</sup> BBC NEWS | Middle East | Iraq war illegal, says Annan

authorized by the House and the Senate to start wars and military operations even if it is not unusual to see conflicts between the executive and the legislative powers.

If we look at European NATO countries, most of them has parliamentary system; even Spain and Italy, the two countries analysed in this thesis have this system, even though with some differences: the most important one, surely, is that Spain is a monarchy and Italy is a republic.

In Spain, the Constitution gives to the King the power to declare war and sign peace treaties<sup>91</sup>, but only with the authorization of the Cortes Generales; furthermore, the King has the formal authority on the armed forces<sup>92</sup>, even if, in practice, is the Government that manage foreign and defence policies of the Country<sup>93</sup>.

About that there's not only the Constitution but also an important law, the "Ley Orgánica de Criterios Básicos de la Defensa Nacional y de la Organización Militar", in which there is written that is duty of the Prime Minister to manage and coordinate armed forces, direct military operations and define strategies and targets<sup>94</sup>.

In recent years, Spain participated in several international military operations: Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan but in neither of them the Cortes Generales adopted a formal declaration of war or authorization as the Constitution expects; the Spanish Government has the major role in these crises<sup>95</sup>. In 1991, when Spain sent its troops to reinforce the embargo, there weren't particular reactions against the bypass of Parliament, because the embargo was requested by UN and because that operation didn't need strikes and combats<sup>96</sup>.

A different situation appeared eight years later for Kosovo<sup>97</sup>: in March 1999 the Spanish Parliament approved Government's guidelines that permitted Spanish armed forces to help in peace process for the region. This situation changed earlier when the Atlantic Council decided to start Operation Allied Force and Spain actively participated in airstrikes against Serbs military targets.

Despite this important change, the Cortes Generales weren't involved and in this case the opposition, at that time PSOE, accused Spanish Government to act outside UN mandate and, consequently, against parliamentary resolution; furthermore, the oppositions proposed new mechanism for improving parliamentary control over military participations in the future, but without any fortune.

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<sup>91</sup> Constitución Española, Art. 63.3

<sup>92</sup> Constitución Española, Art. 62

<sup>93</sup> Constitución Española, Art. 97

<sup>94</sup> Ley Orgánica de Criterios Básicos de la Defensa Nacional y de la Organización Militar n°4/1981, Art. 8

<sup>95</sup> Vidal Prado C., La disciplina della guerra nella Costituzione spagnola, par. 4

<sup>96</sup> Vidal Prado C., La disciplina della guerra nella Costituzione spagnola, par. 4.1

<sup>97</sup> Vidal Prado C., La disciplina della guerra nella Costituzione spagnola, par. 4.2

Finally, regarding intervention in Afghanistan after 9/11 terrorist attacks<sup>98</sup> when, for the first time in history, was called Article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty, the Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, in an urgent session of Parliament, declared full legitimacy of military intervention for both international law and constitutional level, since it was an intervention of self-defence.

Almost the totality of the Parliament agreed with this definition and with the Government's position, but the opposition criticized the poor level of information given to the Parliament and the public opinion.

As we can see, in Spain the Government has a predominant role and not always involve the Cortes Generales, even if the Constitution gives them an important power.

Looking at the other country analysed in this thesis, Italy, we can find some similarities with Spain. According to the Constitution, the Head of State – which in Italy is the President of the Republic – is the Commander of the armed forces and led the Defence Supreme Council and, finally, has the power to declare war<sup>99</sup>; the declaration is possible to be made only after a vote of the Italian Parliament.

In the Defence Supreme Council, the President works closely with the Government: the Head of Government and several Ministers (defence, foreign affairs, internal affairs, economy and economic development) are members of the Council, which has an important function in coordination between political and military institutions – also the Chief of Defence Staff participates at the Council's meetings – in national defence and security field<sup>100</sup>.

The general guidelines of foreign and defence policy are made by the government and, according to some scholars, there is a general trend – not only in Italy but for several western countries – that shows how parliamentary war powers are reduced and how Governments have an increasing role<sup>101</sup>. Even in Italy there are studies that defined the role of Italian Parliament “weak”: if we look at 124 cases in the post-WWII period, we can see that the two Chambers<sup>102</sup>:

- 1) in 49 have intervened before deployment;
- 2) in 11 have intervened at the same time of deployment;
- 3) in 34 have intervened after deployment;
- 4) in 30 did not intervene at all.

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<sup>98</sup> Vidal Prado C., *La disciplina della guerra nella Costituzione spagnola*, par. 4.3

<sup>99</sup> Costituzione Italiana, Art. 87

<sup>100</sup> Consiglio supremo di difesa (quirinale.it)

<sup>101</sup> Coticchia, F., & Moro, F. N. (2020). *Peaceful legislatures? Parliaments and military interventions after the Cold War: Insights from Germany and Italy*.

<sup>102</sup> Di Camillo F., & Tessari P. (2013). *Italian Missions Abroad: National Interests and Procedural Practice*, IAI Working Papers 1307

One important change occurred in 2001 when On. Elvio Ruffino, MP of centre-left coalition “L’Ulivo”, presented a resolution for introducing parliamentary votes on missions and their financing<sup>103</sup>, but this was more a formal change rather than practical.

The debate in the Italian Parliament is made when the Government approved an urgent<sup>104</sup> decree to allocate money on military operations, this is called “Mission decree”<sup>105</sup>.

According to Openpolis Foundation<sup>106</sup>, which collect votes in Italian Parliament and other political data, for this decree there isn’t a sufficient discussion and often is supported also by the opposition.

In its report on Italian cooperation policies made in 2015<sup>107</sup>, in that legislature the discussion on this decree in Parliament – including both Committee and plenary session – was around 23 hours, less than a half of the hours needed for discuss the decree on housing tax (70 hours).

In this report of 2015 is also possible to see the consensus on Mission decree over years: looking at the last Government led by Silvio Berlusconi, PD voted in favour of it even if it was minority at that time; only the left-wing populist party Italia dei Valori voted against the decree.

When there were Monti’s and Letta’s Governments, the consensus on the decree replied to the majority/minority normal division but is important to underline that both of them were executives supported by both left and right parties, so with a bipartisan majority.

Under Matteo Renzi’s Government, centre-right party Forza Italia, which supported Letta, became opposition but continued to support and vote favourably this decree.

In XVII legislature for the first time were elected MPs from populist party Five Star Movement (M5S), which was always at opposition and always voted against every decree from every Government.

In 2018 after the general elections for the XVIII legislature M5S was the major parliamentary group and was majority party in all the three Governments of this legislature: Conte I with far-right party Northern League; Conte II with PD and other centre-left parties, and finally Draghi, a national unity government supported by all the forces except for far-right party Brothers of Italy (FdI) supported in the scenario of global COVID-19 pandemic. As we can see, three very different majorities.

In recent years, the rise of populist parties across Europe led to new politological studies to undermine their political positions.

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<sup>103</sup> RISOLUZIONE IN COMMISSIONE 7/01007 presentata da RUFFINO ELVIO (DEMOCRATICI DI SINISTRA - L'ULIVO) in data 20001213 — LodView (camera.it)

<sup>104</sup> According to the Italian Constitution, Art. 77, the Government could adopt decrees, if there is urgency and necessity, which must be voted by the Parliament within 60 days

<sup>105</sup> Missioni militari e politica estera, il ruolo del parlamento e la presenza dell'Italia - inTema n°1 - OpenBlog (openpolis.it)

<sup>106</sup> <https://www.openpolis.it/fondazione/>

<sup>107</sup> Agenda\_Setting\_Cooperazione\_Italiana (openpolis.it)



About M5S, which defined itself post-ideological party, the first question is if identified it as a populist left-wing/left-libertarian party or a populist authoritarian/sovereigntist party<sup>108</sup>.

In their early years in Parliament, M5S seemed closer to left-wing positions, in favour of humanitarian assistance but against combat operations; when in 2018 started first Conte's Government, there was a shift to right in some issues, for example, migration.

It is possible to see that when at Government, M5S started voting in favour of Missions decrees, changing positions from previous years.

Today, with the national unity majority that support Draghi, the consensus on Government's foreign and defence policy is higher than ever.

To summarize, the role of Italian Parliament has decreased in recent years when, on the contrary, the Italian Government increased its centrality in defence policy issue.

Among parliamentary republics in NATO, an opposite case is Germany.

In this country the Parliament has huge power in controlling troops' deployment, after a decision made by the Constitutional Court in 1994 that obliged the Executive to ask for parliamentary approval before any troops' deployment abroad. According to the Court decision, the German army, called Bundeswehr, is a "parliamentary army" whose deployment abroad requires a constitutive Bundestag decision, and all operations have faced parliamentary scrutiny<sup>109</sup>.

During military operations the Bundestag Defence Commission has weekly meetings with Defence's Minister to be briefed; furthermore, this Commission has the power or starting *sua sponte* investigations.

An important figure is the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, who controls and assists the Bundestag in exercising parliamentary oversight and meet regularly with elected officials<sup>110</sup>. Finally, parliamentary minorities can directly ask for the Constitutional Court interventions over executive action<sup>111</sup>.

As we can see, German Parliament has a tight control over military operations, more than the other Countries analysed before.

The last parliamentary democracy we will look at is United Kingdom: a Monarchy and one of the most important member States of the Alliance.

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<sup>108</sup> Coticchia, F., & Vignoli, V. (2020). "Populist parties and foreign policy. The case of Italy's Five Star Movement", *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*

<sup>109</sup> Gareis S.V., 'The Making of Germany's Security and Defense Policy – Actors, Responsibilities, Procedures, and Requirements', in I. Wiesner (ed.), *German Defense Politics* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013)

<sup>110</sup> Act on the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces of the German Bundestag, 1982

<sup>111</sup> Coticchia, F., & Moro, F. N. (2020). *Peaceful legislatures? Parliaments and military interventions after the Cold War: Insights from Germany and Italy*

Differently from other NATO countries, UK has not a written Constitution, but it's ruled by the so called "Common Law" system, where there are mostly customs and precedents so there are no legal obligations for Government and Parliament, also in military operations field.

The British Parliament is composed by two chambers, the House of Commons – directly elected by citizens – and the House of Lords, which members are nominated.

In the House of Commons, has an important role the Defence Committee, appointed to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces<sup>112</sup>.

As we said before, there are no legal obligations in this field, but in 2011 the Government acknowledged a convention – according to someone it lacks clarity and is open to various interpretations – for which the House of Commons would have the opportunity to debate the deployment of military forces prior to the deployment, except in the event of an emergency<sup>113</sup>.

In 2013, the Tory Government was defeated in a vote on airstrikes in Syria and this was viewed as an assertion of Parliamentary sovereignty on such matters<sup>114</sup>.

Otherwise, there were in recent years limited airstrikes against the Syrian regime's chemical weapons capabilities that were decided without a debate in the House of Commons, with the Government justifying its actions on humanitarian grounds; the lack of Parliamentary consultation has reignited the debate about formally legislating for Parliament's role in such matters, but since then nothing changed.

Also in UK, despite its parliamentary regime, the role of the Parliament, in this case the House of Commons, seems to be lower than Executive's powers. In this country is important to underline the absence of a written Constitution and, consequently, of formal assignment of war powers.

Another institutional system is semi presidentialism; in NATO countries the most important one having this system is surely France.

Similarly to the other countries analysed, even in France the Constitution gives the President the role of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces<sup>115</sup>; the Article 16 of this document is about the possible situation of threat against French institutions, integrity and sovereignty: in this case the President can assume specific powers after consultations with the Presidents of the two Chambers, the Prime Minister and the Constitutional Council.

During this exceptional period the Parliament cannot be dissolved and, after 30 days, could ask the Constitutional Council an opinion about the renewal of this powers.

According to Article 21, is the Prime Minister the responsible of national defence.

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<sup>112</sup> Defence Committee - Summary - Committees - UK Parliament

<sup>113</sup> Parliamentary approval for military action - House of Commons Library

<sup>114</sup> To intervene or not to intervene? Military operations overseas - UK Parliament

<sup>115</sup> Constitution française, Art. 15

The role of Parliament, composed by the National Assembly and the Senate<sup>116</sup>, is similar to other NATO member States.

The French Parliament can adopt a formal declaration of war.

Regarding troops' deployment, the Government has to inform the Parliament no later than three days after the beginning of the operation, specifying clearly the aim of the mission. During this informative session no vote is required; but if after four months the mission is still underway, then there must be necessary a formal authorization made by the Chambers<sup>117</sup>.

This *iter* was adopted after a constitutional reform, made in 2008<sup>118</sup>, that introduced these balances to the President, previously able to act without consulting the Parliament<sup>119</sup>.

Finally, the last country to look at is Turkey, which is a presidential republic.

Is important to make a focus on this country because of its importance in the Alliance, since Turkish Army, combined active and reserve strength, is composed by a little less than 900.000 soldiers<sup>120</sup> and because of the presence in its territory of NATO bases, like Incirlik, in which are present nuclear weapons.

The other aspect to underline is that Turkey is the worst member State of the Alliance, according to Freedom House, regarding global freedom (with a rate of 32/100) and internet freedom (34/100), the only one considered as “not free”<sup>121</sup>.

The Constitution gives to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey the power to authorize the declaration of a state of war, to send the Turkish Armed Forces to foreign countries and to allow foreign armed forces to be stationed in Turkey, with the exception that if the country is subjected to sudden armed aggression the President of the Republic can decide on the use of Armed Forces<sup>122</sup>.

Furthermore, the President of the Republic has an important role since he/she is Commander in Chief, is responsible to the Parliament and nomines the Chief of the General Staff<sup>123</sup>.

The formal rules under the Turkish Constitution should not hide the situation of recent years when President Erdogan reformed the Constitution and Turkey passed from being parliamentary regime to a presidential one and he centred power on him and his inner circle. After the attempted coup of 2016, Erdogan also decided to change the top generals of the Army who were against him and appointed loyal ones, increasing his control to the Turkish Armed Forces.

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<sup>116</sup> Constitution française, Art. 24

<sup>117</sup> Constitution française, Art. 35

<sup>118</sup> Assemblée nationale - Pouvoirs publics: modernisation des institutions de la Ve République (assemblee-nationale.fr)

<sup>119</sup> French constitutional changes. July 2008 - About-France.com

<sup>120</sup> <http://www.iiss.org/>

<sup>121</sup> Explore the Map | Freedom House

<sup>122</sup> Turkish Constitution, Art. 92

<sup>123</sup> Turkish Constitution, Art. 117

In conclusion, it is possible to assume that the issue of parliamentary war powers in NATO countries is difficult to analyse because it needs to be seen on two levels: on one hand, the formal rules adopted by the Constitutions and the laws, that give to the Parliaments formal powers as, for example, declaring war. However, in recent years is it possible to see in many countries a trend that shows an increasing power for Governments and, on the contrary, less importance for Parliament.

The troops' deployment abroad in the context of international missions, whether humanitarian, PKO or combat ones, doesn't follow the classical procedure of war declaration but often were decided by the Government and only later the Parliament discusses and votes about them and their financing but with a small debate about tactical aspects (RoE, military aims and operating areas).

One exception to this trend is Germany where, as we saw in previous pages, the Bundestag has a tight control on German Armed Forces and Government's policies and decisions.

## THE CASE OF ITALY

### *FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY OF PD (DEMOCRATIC PARTY) AND LEFT PARTIES IN THE “SECONDA REPUBBLICA”*

The period called “Seconda Repubblica” is generally considered starting in the mid-90s and was a period of huge changes in Italian party’s system: the historical Italian left parties (Communist, Socialist and Social democratic) disappeared or evolved ideologically.

The former PCI was divided in two new formations: the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS), closer to European socialism and formed by the majority of PCI establishment; on the other hand, the leftist and more related to USSR minority founded Communist Refoundation (PRC).

Otherwise, both PSI and PSDI were dissolved in the 90s and since then a lot of small formations continue to rise and fall in a process commonly known as “diaspora”.

The Italian political system was also affected by the change of the electoral system, from proportional to a mixed one with 75% of seats assigned with the *first past the post*<sup>1</sup>, and this change led to new alliances and a sort of bipolarism.

In 1996 the left coalition, called “L’Ulivo” won the elections, and consequently was in charge of the Country during Yugoslavia’s war, the first major scenario that militarily involved NATO, as we saw in the previous chapter.

Italian government showed strong support and played active role in Kosovo’s war: in these years, according to some authors, Italy changed its strategic role from ‘security consumer’ – as it was in the post WWII era – to ‘security provider’<sup>2</sup>.

One of the main problems was the fact that the Italian government led by Massimo D’Alema, first PM in Italy who was member of the Communist Party and in 1999 leader of DS (Leftist democrats), was composed by a huge coalition, in which the leftist parties<sup>3</sup> were against NATO intervention<sup>4</sup>.

These parties were extremely important because their seats were necessary for reaching the majority in Parliament.

Despite the PdCI leader Armando Cossutta declared that NATO intervention was “illegal” during parliamentary debate, his party never stopped to support the Government; he officially motivated this

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<sup>1</sup> Legge 276/1993, Legge 277/1993

<sup>2</sup> Coticchia, F. and F.N. Moro (2020) "From enthusiasm to retreat. Italy and military missions abroad after the Cold War", IPS - Italian Political Science, 15 (1), 2020

<sup>3</sup> PdCI (Party of Italian communists) and Greens

<sup>4</sup> “D’Alema: nel Kosovo siamo con la Nato.”, *La Stampa*, 19 January 1999

decision because of the possibility of having an active role in diplomatic solution of the crisis, possible only if PdCI remained at government<sup>5</sup>. Also the Greens stressed this point<sup>6</sup>.

According to some scholars, the decision of leftist parties could also be explained with the so called “Blame Hypothesis”: one year before, in 1998, Communist Refoundation decided to withdraw from centre-left majority and at the European elections of 1999 its vote percentage was halved<sup>7</sup>; according to this hypothesis this happened because the voters blamed the party for its disloyalty<sup>8</sup>.

The Italian Parliament approved on April 13, 1999, a resolution regarding Kosovo<sup>9</sup>; the support on this resolution was around 60%, one of the lowest in the period of the Seconda Repubblica and one of the few cases in which bipartisan consensus was broken<sup>10</sup>.

In opinion of who’s writing that these events, nevertheless were before the period we’re analysing in this thesis, are necessary as a premise of the foreign and defence policies – and also of the public debate on these issues – in the Italian left in 21<sup>st</sup> century.

After the XIII legislature, in which were formed 4 governments (Prodi, D’Alema I, D’Alema II, Amato) in 5 years, the Parliamentary elections of 2001 were gained by centre-right coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi.

In the electoral manifesto<sup>11</sup> of the centre-left coalition “L’Ulivo” the first passage regarding defence policy was about the creation of a sort of European defence that, in their intentions, would have started in 2003, but this never happened. This idea had to be intended not in substitution of NATO but as complementary and strictly related to the transatlantic commitment of Italy, as the Alliance was defined “cornerstone of common defence”; L’Ulivo also supported the enlargement to eastern countries to guarantee stability but without the isolation of Russian Federation, with which is important to have good relations.

Finally, the coalition defended the decision regarding Kosovo in previous years, defined as humanitarian intervention, saying that those kinds of interventions demonstrated Italy’s reliability and capacity of intervention in situation of crisis.

The first months of XIV legislature were difficult for the government, with the G8 held in Genoa and the terrorists attack on 9/11 against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

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<sup>5</sup> Armando Cossutta, Speech at Chamber of Deputies, March 26, 1999

<sup>6</sup> Luigi Manconi, Speech at Senate, March 26, 1999

<sup>7</sup> If we compare it with Parliamentary elections in 1996

<sup>8</sup> Coticchia, F. and Davidson J. (2018). The Limits of Radical Parties in Coalition Foreign Policy: Italy, Hijacking, and the Extremity Hypothesis. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 14(2), 149–168

<sup>9</sup> Dalla guerra del Golfo all’Iraq, quando le Camere hanno detto sì agli aiuti militari - Il Sole 24 ORE

<sup>10</sup> Coticchia, F. and V. Vignoli, (2019), Italian political parties and military operations. An empirical analysis on voting patterns", *Government and Opposition*

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.perlulivo.it/politiche2001/programma.pdf>

The Chamber of Deputies was reunited the day after, in which all parliamentary groups condemned the attacks<sup>12</sup>.

For the opposition spoke Massimo D'Alema, former Italian PM and member of DS; Francesco Rutelli, leader of the coalition in 2001 elections and member of La Margherita; Fausto Bertinotti, leader of PRC; Oliviero Diliberto, leader of PdCI and Alfonso Pecoraro Scanio for the Greens.

In addition to the dutiful condemnations, is interesting to see that the left leaders stressed the point of the possible risks of a spiral of conflict and violence.

This was, as expected, more relevant for Bertinotti, Diliberto and Pecoraro Scanio while D'Alema said that, even if political way to solve crises has the priority, sometimes use of force could be inevitable and Rutelli ended his speech saying "we think it's necessary to equip ourselves to face, all together, risks and threats that I don't think ended yesterday. We must do it together with Europe and with the Atlantic Alliance. We are ready to do it because for the freedom of all and for keeping peace in the world".

The United States and other western countries decided to start Operation Enduring Freedom to fight against Taliban regime that ruled Afghanistan in those years; the Italian participation started on November 18<sup>th</sup>, 2001<sup>13</sup>: the Italian government approved a decree<sup>14</sup>, converted *ex post* by the Parliament<sup>15</sup>. It was the first time that an Italian law regarding deployment of troops abroad quoted, in the premise, the Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The main parliamentary groups of centre-left (DS and La Margherita) assured their support to the deployment of troops in Afghanistan<sup>16</sup>, but not at the first time: they voted against the first resolutions in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate on 9 October 2001<sup>17</sup>.

The law n. 6, January 31<sup>st</sup>, 2002, was approved with 363 yes and 36 no<sup>18</sup> at the Chamber of Deputies and 140 yes, 25 no<sup>19</sup> at the Senate.

The involvement of western countries in Middle East continued with the start of Iraq War in March 19<sup>th</sup> 2003, when President Bush addressed the United States saying that "American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the World from great danger"<sup>20</sup>.

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<sup>12</sup> [http://documenti.camera.it/\\_dati/leg14/lavori/stenografici/sed031/sintero.pdf](http://documenti.camera.it/_dati/leg14/lavori/stenografici/sed031/sintero.pdf)

<sup>13</sup> Camera dei deputati Dossier D05111

<sup>14</sup> D.L. 1 dicembre 2001, n. 421

<sup>15</sup> L. 31 gennaio 2002, n. 6

<sup>16</sup> st108 1..108 (senato.it)

<sup>17</sup> Coticchia, F. and V. Vignoli, (2019), Italian political parties and military operations. An empirical analysis on voting patterns", Government and Opposition

<sup>18</sup> sed088 (camera.it)

<sup>19</sup> Parlamento Italiano - Disegno di legge S. 914 - 14<sup>a</sup> Legislatura (senato.it)

<sup>20</sup> President Bush Announces Start of Iraq War - YouTube

The “great danger” was the Iraqi program to develop weapons of mass destruction, even if these weapons were never founded<sup>21</sup>.

Italy was part of the international Coalition that supported the War<sup>22</sup>, but there wasn't a support of the entire Atlantic Alliance: important countries as France and Germany decided to stay out of this conflict.

During a very tense plenary in the Italian Chamber<sup>23</sup>, all the speeches from the opposition groups were against the involvement in the Operation Iraqi Freedom, as it was called.

The main points that Piero Fassino (DS), Francesco Rutelli (La Margherita) and other MPs stressed out were the spiral of instability – and the risk of terrorist attacks in Italy – that would come from the conflict in Iraq and the pacific way to reach Iraqi disarmament asked by the UN.

Left-wing opposition presented a resolution<sup>24</sup> that asked the Government to exclude logistic, diplomatic and military support (also military bases) to the international Coalition.

This resolution<sup>25</sup> was not approved, with 247 yes and 305 no; on the contrary, the resolution<sup>26</sup> presented by the majority which “approves the declarations made by the Government”, was approved with 304 yes and 246 no.

The debate around Iraq returned few months later, on November 12<sup>th</sup>, 2003, after the tragic attack against Italian military base in Nassiriya which was obviously condemned by all political forces; in this brutal attack 28 people died<sup>27</sup>.

Otherwise, because of this event some divergences emerged in the left-wing opposition: the leftist parties in the Parliament renewed their appeals for immediate withdrawal<sup>28</sup> while the DS and La Margherita said only that the Italian role in that mission must be reviewed<sup>29</sup> but that withdrawal would be a mistake<sup>30</sup>.

Till the end of XIV legislature the involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan was the main issues in Italian foreign and defence policy; since the missions did not finish before 2006, these were also central in the electoral manifestos for the parliamentary elections held that year.

The left-wing coalition was called L'Unione and won these elections gaining a very small majority in the Italian Parliament, in fact the XV legislature was only two-years long.

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<sup>21</sup> quelle armi mai trovate - la Repubblica.it

<sup>22</sup> <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/iraq/news/20030327-10.html>

<sup>23</sup> [http://documenti.camera.it/\\_dati/leg14/lavori/stenografici/sed283/sintero.pdf](http://documenti.camera.it/_dati/leg14/lavori/stenografici/sed283/sintero.pdf)

<sup>24</sup> [http://documenti.camera.it/\\_dati/leg14/lavori/stenografici/sed283/aintero.pdf](http://documenti.camera.it/_dati/leg14/lavori/stenografici/sed283/aintero.pdf)

<sup>25</sup> (6-00056) «Violante, Castagnetti, Giordano, Boato, Marco Rizzo, Intini, Pecoraro Scanio, Pisicchio»

<sup>26</sup> (6-00057) «Vito, La Russa, Volontè, Cè, Moroni»

<sup>27</sup> 19 Italians and 9 Iraqis

<sup>28</sup> “Ritiro immediato. Verdi e comunisti rinnovano l'appello”, *Corriere della Sera*, 13 November 2003

<sup>29</sup> “Margherita e SDI con la Quercia: missione da rivedere”, *Corriere della Sera*, 13 November 2003

<sup>30</sup> “L'Ulivo si divide. I DS: non ci si può ritirare ora”, *Corriere della Sera*, 13 November 2003



The electoral program of L'Unione<sup>31</sup> contained, for the reason we said before, a bigger section for foreign and defence policy than the electoral program of L'Ulivo five years before.

As it was in 2001, one of the first points stressed was a major European integration also for common foreign and security policy (CFSP), for having “better means of intervention in international security”.

Italian left-wing coalition thought that no European country could face alone the threats and challenges in the global arena: L'Unione proposed reforms that would have been huge but still today are not more than proposals: the institution of a common European Minister of foreign affairs, a seat in the UN Security Council for the EU and the creation of the “white helmets”, a European PK force able to intervene in conflict areas.

The electoral manifesto talked also about the theme of this thesis: the vote of Parliament for military operations, for which L'Unione believed that was better voting for every single mission and not just one decree with all of them.

One important passage is about Iraq War, which was defined as a “serious mistake” not helpful in the fight against terrorism that, for the coalition, should be fought firstly with economic, social and political means, not just using force. L'Unione said that at government it would have proposed the withdrawal of Italian military personnel in Iraq “in the technically necessary timeframe and in consultation with the Iraqi authorities”.

As previously said, L'Unione won 2006 elections and then formed a government guided by Romano Prodi.

As it was written in the electoral manifesto, the Government announced the withdrawal of the troops from Nassiriya base and the end of the operation called Ancient Babylon, with the flag lowering ceremony on December 1<sup>st</sup>, 2006<sup>32</sup>.

Similarly to the XIII legislature, foreign policy and deployment of troops abroad were fields in which there were contrasts within the government, because of the differences between the radical partners of coalition and the main parties (DS and La Margherita).

The mission ISAF in Afghanistan, for some scholars an important one because it gave Italy a central role in the Afghan crisis<sup>33</sup>, was considered wrong by leftist parties (Greens, PRC and PdCI), even if their leaders declared that the government was safe<sup>34</sup>.

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<sup>31</sup> [http://www.unioneweb.it/wp-content/uploads/documents/programma\\_def\\_unione.pdf](http://www.unioneweb.it/wp-content/uploads/documents/programma_def_unione.pdf)

<sup>32</sup> [https://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op\\_int\\_conclude/Iraq\\_AnticaBabilonia/Pagine/default.aspx](https://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op_int_conclude/Iraq_AnticaBabilonia/Pagine/default.aspx)

<sup>33</sup> Coralluzzo V. (2012) ‘Le Missioni Italiane all’Estero: Problemi e Prospettive’, in Carati A., ed.: ‘L’Italia fra Nuove Politiche di Difesa e Impegni Internazionali’, ISPI Studies, available at: <http://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/ISPI%20StudiesItalia.htm>

<sup>34</sup> Coticchia, F. and Davidson J. (2018). The Limits of Radical Parties in Coalition Foreign Policy: Italy, Hijacking, and the Extremity Hypothesis. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 14(2), 149–168

Otherwise, on February 21<sup>st</sup>, 2007, the majority was defeated in the vote for the renewal of missions abroad because of a few group – but decisive, since the narrow majority of left-wing coalition in the Parliament - of leftist Deputies that, despite the indication of their group, voted against it; this was the first time an Italian government was defeated in this kind of parliamentary vote<sup>35</sup>.

One month later the government survived a confidence vote and a new vote regarding military operations, confirming, as it happened in 1999, that is difficult for junior partners of the coalition to go out of the majority despite their opposition to these policies.

In 2008, the second Prodi government didn't survive a confidence vote in the Senate and resigned after only two years.

That spring were held the general election in which, for the first time, was present the Democratic Party (PD), centre-left party founded in 2007 by the union of DS, La Margherita and other minor formations. PD was in coalition with IdV<sup>36</sup>, a left-populist party, but broke the alliance with PRC, PdCI and Greens, that formed an electoral list called “La Sinistra l’Arcobaleno”.

The elections were won by centre-right coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi, which formed his fourth government, PD at its debut was voted by 33% of voters and went to opposition, La Sinistra l’Arcobaleno, only received 3% of votes and didn't gain any seat: for the first time since the born of the Republic, there were no communists in the Italian Parliament.

The electoral manifesto<sup>37</sup> of the Italian democrats was similar to the previous ones of the left-wing coalitions but in some cases was even more explicit: for example, it was clearly said that the friendship with the US had to be maintained and reinforced; the opinion of who is writing is that this aspect would not be possible if PD was still in coalition with communist parties.

PD reaffirmed the importance for Italy to remain in EU and to develop major integration, also in foreign and defence policy and to maintain the role of actor in multipolar world, sustaining international peacekeeping operations.

Generally speaking, the program of Democratic Party was in continuity with the foreign policy of left-wing governments in the 90s and in 2006-2008, but the 2008 electoral manifesto didn't give so much importance on foreign and defence policy, it was more concentrated on domestic economic policies and institutional reforms.

On the other hand, La Sinistra l’Arcobaleno, in its manifesto<sup>38</sup> had an entire paragraph called “peace and disarmament”: for this list Italy shouldn't have participated more in international missions if not

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<sup>35</sup> Coticchia, F. and V. Vignoli, (2019), Italian political parties and military operations. An empirical analysis on voting patterns", Government and Opposition

<sup>36</sup> Italia dei Valori

<sup>37</sup> Sintesi programma PD Veltroni Elezioni 2008 (slideshare.net)

<sup>38</sup> la Sinistra l’Arcobaleno » IL PROGRAMMA (archive.org)

under UN and it also stated that about the foreign military bases in Italy there should be a discussion on their closure.

After the elections and the huge defeat of this coalition, the parties that formed it weren't able to stay together and to transform La Sinistra l'Arcobaleno into a party.

The Democratic Part, at the beginning of XVI legislature decided to form a shadow cabinet close to the British model, even if that was ruled by laws differently from this one.

The aim of the PD's shadow cabinet was to better coordinate the opposition to Berlusconi's fourth government and to start writing the next electoral program.

The shadow foreign Minister was Piero Fassino and the shadow defence Minister was Roberta Pinotti<sup>39</sup>, which later in this chapter will be interviewed.

After Veltroni's resignation from the role of party's secretary in 2009, the shadow cabinet wasn't renewed by the new secretary *ad interim* Dario Franceschini<sup>40</sup>.

In the same year, PD celebrated its national congress<sup>41</sup> in which was elected as new secretary Pier Luigi Bersani, former Minister of industry and economic development during previous left-wing governments.

There were two events in those years that affected the progressist community all around the world: the economic crisis of 2008 and the election of Barack Obama as POTUS, the first African American in history and, after 8 years of GOP administration, a Democrat.

Starting from these events, Bersani stated in his program<sup>42</sup> that the global order of the last 30 years is ending and a transition to "something new" is starting.

In this period of transition, for him was important that European social democracies went over their own national interest and started to think of a common European social democratic platform to challenge new international threats as the economic crisis, the globalization and the environmental crisis.

The role of international missions wasn't mentioned except for one sentence: "Nobody thinks that is yet possible to deploy troops all over the world", as an example in a more general discourse about the changes in international relations.

It is not surprising that foreign and defence policy had few spaces in this document, since in Italy those are not relevant issues in the public debate, the candidate decided to choose to talk mostly about economic issues, other domestic policies and internal organization of the party.

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<sup>39</sup> Partito Democratico (archive.org)

<sup>40</sup> Decade il governo ombra - PartitoDemocratico.it (archive.org)

<sup>41</sup> The procedure of PD for the renewal of its internal offices

<sup>42</sup> "Un senso a questa storia" Manifesto of Pierluigi Bersani, PD Congress 2009

The first international crisis after Bersani's election as head of the party was related to Arab Springs, especially the one in Libya.

Libyan dictator Gaddafi used repression against its own citizens, this was condemned by international community with a resolution of UNSC<sup>43</sup>

On late February, NATO countries started to discuss about a no-fly zone over Libya and on March 19<sup>th</sup> military operations started under the command of several countries; after 12 days NATO took the leading of these operations with a unitarian mission called Unified Protector<sup>44</sup>.

Italy participated actively to this intervention and there was a huge debate about the causes that forced the country to intervene: according to some scholars the presence of Italian national interests<sup>45</sup> in Libya was the main factor, others have focused on humanitarian aspects<sup>46</sup> and on R2P<sup>47</sup>, as UNSC resolution 1973 authorized "all necessary measures [...] to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack"; finally, another school of thought underlined the international prestige as main factor<sup>48</sup>.

In the Chamber of Deputies, the resolution<sup>49</sup> on this operation was approved with 300 yes and 293 no<sup>50</sup>, only with seven votes of margin, one of the most narrowed voting sessions on military involvement<sup>51</sup>.

Not only left-wing parties, but also Northern League, which was part of the centre-right government, was against the Italian involvement in Libya, especially because of the possible consequent migration crisis.

The Operation Unified Protector was concluded in October 2011, after Gaddafi's death and the regime's fall.

In 2013, Bersani was head of the centre-left coalition "Italia Bene Comune" for the general elections, when PD made an electoral agreement with Left, Ecology, Liberty (SEL) and other minor parties as Socialists and Democratic Center.

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<sup>43</sup> UNSC resolution 1970

<sup>44</sup> Ceccorulli M. & Coticchia F. (2015) Multidimensional Threats and Military Engagement: The Case of the Italian Intervention in Libya, *Mediterranean Politics*, 20:3, 303-321

<sup>45</sup> Croci, O., & Valigi, M. (2013). Continuity and change in Italian foreign policy: the case of the international intervention in Libya. *Contemporary Italian Politics*, 5(1), 38-54

<sup>46</sup> Bellamy A., Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm, *Ethics and International Affairs* 25 (3):263-269 (2011)

<sup>47</sup> Responsibility to Protect

<sup>48</sup> Carati, A., & Locatelli, A. (2017). Cui prodest? Italy's questionable involvement in multilateral military operations amid ethical concerns and national interest. *International peacekeeping*, 24(1), 86-107

<sup>49</sup> (6-00071) «Cicchitto, Reguzzoni, Corsaro, Stefani, Sardelli, Scilipoti»

<sup>50</sup> [https://www.camera.it/\\_dati/leg16/lavori/stenografici/sed452/SINTERO.pdf](https://www.camera.it/_dati/leg16/lavori/stenografici/sed452/SINTERO.pdf)

<sup>51</sup> Coticchia, F. and V. Vignoli, (2019), Italian political parties and military operations. An empirical analysis on voting patterns", *Government and Opposition*

In the electoral manifesto of the coalition<sup>52</sup>, foreign policy issues were strictly close to the EU policies; other than the general commitment to European institutions, centre-left underlined its opposition to austerity and economic decisions of the previous years; despite the role of Italian armed forces in Libya and the number of Italian troops deployed abroad, nothing relevant was written in the program regarding defence policies.

The far-left parties reorganized themselves in a coalition called Rivoluzione Civile, which like Italia Bene Comune, talked of foreign policy for what concerned EU austerity policies<sup>53</sup>, with even stronger critics.

Even if the centre-left coalition was the most voted in 2013 elections, it didn't reach the majority in the Italian Senate, because of the comeback of centre-right (underestimated in pre-elections polls) and the result of M5S, which in its first election was voted by 25%.

Because of this outcome, was formed a government supported by PD and Berlusconi's PdL; both broke their coalitions with SEL and Northern League that went to opposition. This executive wasn't guided by Bersani but by his deputy secretary, Enrico Letta.

Rivoluzione Civile wasn't able to gain any seat, with only 2% of the votes, even a worse result than far-left coalition five years before.

Under Letta government started Operation Mare Nostrum, with the main aims of saving migrants who tried to arrive in Europe and to contrast illegal immigration<sup>54</sup>; this mission was substituted one year later by Triton<sup>55</sup>.

After the general elections, Bersani resigned as PD secretary and in the party's congress in December 2013 was elected Matteo Renzi, young mayor of Florence which was part of the moderate/liberal area of PD.

In his political platform<sup>56</sup>, he stressed the point of the entrance of PD in the PES as a full member and the necessity of a strongest EU, in a federal model, with a common defence policy and a common army.

He won the party's congress with 67% of the votes and, two months later, he became Prime Minister after the revocation of confidence to Letta's government.

Under his government, Italy led the EU Council in the second semester of 2014.

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<sup>52</sup> Carta d'Intenti | Italia. Bene Comune. (archive.org)

<sup>53</sup> ELEZIONI 2013/ Il programma della Lista Antonio Ingroia per Rivoluzione Civile (ilsussidiario.net)

<sup>54</sup> Mare Nostrum - Marina Militare (difesa.it)

<sup>55</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XYxwYgEMxkM>

<sup>56</sup> "L'Italia cambia verso" Manifesto of Matteo Renzi, PD Congress 2013

Despite of Renzi's public declarations during the party congress, when he was Prime Minister he attacked a lot of times "European bureaucrats", especially on immigration policies<sup>57</sup>, probably to maximize his internal consensus.

One of the most important documents of this government was, in May 2015, the White Book for international security and defence<sup>58</sup>, presented by Defence Minister Roberta Pinotti.

In this document, one important element was the importance given to "Enlarged Mediterranean"<sup>59</sup> as a strategic region in which Italy could take the lead and contribute to military operations.

For some scholars<sup>60</sup>, this document is important because of the changes it took to the defence policies in Italy: the first difference from the previous White Paper (2002) was on the inclusion of "several institutions and stakeholders, including civil servants from the MoD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, representatives from the aerospace, security and defence industries, as well as a few civilian experts took part in its formulation"; then, the White Paper of 2015 is unambiguous about the use of force and deterrence, seen not only as a possibility but as opportunity for the defence of national interests; the other differences are the new priority given to stronger cooperation with EU allies and partners as NATO is defined as "the primary framework for deterrence and defence of the country and the wider European continent against any threat" and, as we said before, the strategic importance of Mediterranean region.

One of the main threats in those years were the rise of Daesh, a terrorist organization which proclaimed itself as a State<sup>61</sup> in the territories of Iraq and Syria and, on the other hand, was responsible of terrorist attacks in major European cities as Paris, Brussels and Nice.

The United States started military operations against Daesh in September 2014<sup>62</sup>; President Obama said that to reach the aim of degrade and destroy ISIL is a "targeted, relentless, counterterrorism campaign that combines American airpower, contributions from allies and partners and more support to the forces that are fighting these terrorists on the ground".

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<sup>57</sup> Coticchia, F. and Davidson J. (2019). "Italian Foreign Policy during Matteo Renzi's Government: A Domestically-Focused Outsider and the World." Lexington

<sup>58</sup> Libro Bianco per la sicurezza internazionale e la difesa - Difesa.it

<sup>59</sup> For a definition of the 'Enlarged Mediterranean' region, see Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale, 'Rapporto 2020. Le scelte di politica estera', April 2008; Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa, Il Concetto Strategico del Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa (Rome: MAECI, 2005)

<sup>60</sup> Gilli, A., Ungaro, A. R., & Marrone, A. (2015). The Italian White Paper for International Security and Defence. The RUSI Journal, 160(6), 34-41

<sup>61</sup> Iraq crisis: Isis changes name and declares its territories a new Islamic state with 'restoration of caliphate' in Middle East, *independent.co.uk*, 29 June 2014

<sup>62</sup> Weekly Address: We Will Degrade and Destroy ISIL - YouTube

Italy supported the international coalition<sup>63</sup> against ISIL with Operation Prima Parthica<sup>64</sup>, with the main role of air recognition and surveillance and training of Peshmerga in Iraqi Kurdistan<sup>65</sup>.

Furthermore, Italian Armed Forces from 2015<sup>66</sup> to 2019<sup>67</sup> oversaw Mosul Dam's protection, a strategic infrastructure for water supply to thousands of people.

After the defeat on a constitutional reform referendum (December 2016), Renzi resigned as head of government, replaced by his Foreign Affairs Minister Gentiloni, and as leader of PD, but he returned to this role after the party's congress, in which Renzi was voted by 69% of party members.

In the last months of XVII legislature, Gentiloni government decided to start a mission in Niger; at that time, Minister Pinotti declared that the aim of this mission "will not be combat, but training and border control in coordination with France and US"<sup>68</sup>. The opinion of the Italian government was that the stabilization of Sahel, an area in which are present terrorist organizations and criminal ones related to illegal migration, is a crucial aspect of national security<sup>69</sup>.

In the Chamber of Deputies this mission was voted in the Missions Decree of 2018<sup>70</sup>, the two groups of centre-left voted differently: PD voted in favour, the other parties – reunited for the upcoming elections in a coalition called Free and Equals (LeU) – voted against it<sup>71</sup>.

In 2018 elections there were three left-wing formations: PD, LeU – composed by SI (former SEL) and Art.1<sup>72</sup> – and PaP (Power to the People), formed by PRC and other far left minor formations.

The electoral manifesto of PD<sup>73</sup>, after 5 years of government, in the first part claimed the results obtained; in the "new purposes" section, about foreign policy it was present, as always, the priority to reach a strengthen EU, not only in economic and social affairs, but also in migration policies and as "peace and development force in the world".

About European common defence PD proposed the creation of a fund for it, with the aim of major integration not only for conventional armies but also European intelligence and, for the first time, to face the new threat of cybersecurity.

It was also reaffirmed the commitment to diplomatic efforts and military operations in crisis' scenarios and the importance of the Mediterranean area, Africa and Middle East.

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<sup>63</sup> <https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/>

<sup>64</sup> Op. Prima Parthica, contributo nazionale (difesa.it)

<sup>65</sup> Gli istruttori italiani completano l'addestramento di altri 250 Peshmerga - Difesa.it

<sup>66</sup> TRUPPE ITALIANE A DIFESA DELLA DIGA DI MOSUL – Analisi Difesa

<sup>67</sup> Iraq: i militari italiani hanno lasciato la diga di Mosul (difesa.it)

<sup>68</sup> La EUCAP Sahel Niger: nuova missione italiana in Niger - DirittoConsenso

<sup>69</sup> Missione bilaterale di supporto nella Repubblica del Niger (MISIN) (difesa.it)

<sup>70</sup> [https://www.camera.it/leg17/522?tema=autorizzazione\\_e\\_proroga\\_di\\_missioni\\_internazionali\\_per\\_l\\_anno\\_2018\\_](https://www.camera.it/leg17/522?tema=autorizzazione_e_proroga_di_missioni_internazionali_per_l_anno_2018_)

<sup>71</sup> La camera approva la missione militare italiana in Niger - Annalisa Camilli - Internazionale

<sup>72</sup> Art.1 is a party born in February 2017 by formed PD members that exited from it because against Renzi's policies

<sup>73</sup> Programma PD - Elezioni Politiche 2018 (partitodemocratico.it)

On the other hand, LeU, has a section in his program<sup>74</sup> called “Peace and disarmament” in which, despite most of its members (especially the ones from Art. 1) were part of PD, is possible to find some differences between these two formations.

LeU program stressed the point of a foreign policy of cooperation and respect of human rights, refusing military operations abroad and searching a “diplomatic way” to solve international disputes. They accused the growth of public spending for defence policies (1,42% of GDP in 2018) and call the Italian armaments industry to respect the law<sup>75</sup> that limited export in countries which started wars, citing the example of Saudi Arabia in Yemen.

The third, and more radical formation, PaP, had a political manifesto<sup>76</sup> similar to the previous far left coalitions, calling for pacifism and stressing anti-US and anti-NATO positions.

The results of the elections were bad for the left-wing: PD reached its low since the foundation (18,76%), LeU gained few seats with 3,39% of the votes<sup>77</sup> and PaP obtained only 1,13% without obtaining any seat.

In the XVIII legislature, which is the current Italian legislature, were formed three different governments.

The first one, Conte I, was supported by M5S and Northern League, that in 2017 abandoned its previous policies on Northern Italy independence and became a far-right nationalist and populist movement, since then called just “League”<sup>78</sup>.

On foreign and defence policy this government, considered at that time one of the most populist in the EU, reaffirmed in its contract<sup>79</sup> the commitment to the Atlantic Alliance and the privileged alliance with the US, but – in contrast with western allies – there was also a specific part on Russia, defined as an “partner for economic issues and for the crises’ management”, it was also asked to delete the sanctions against Russia, in force since the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.

On the contrary, EU institutions were attacked, specially by Matteo Salvini, leader of the League, because of the migration policies of it; on this the models to follow were, according to him, countries like Hungary and Poland<sup>80</sup>, despite some differences on this issue (Italy wanted the reform of EU migration policy asking for more cooperation from other EU members while Visegrad countries did not) and on Russia (eastern countries, specially Poland, are the harsher against Russian Federation).

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<sup>74</sup> Il Programma di Liberi e Uguali - Liberi e Uguali

<sup>75</sup> Legge 185/1990

<sup>76</sup> <https://poterealpopolo.org/potere-al-popolo/manifesto/>

<sup>77</sup> The threshold was 3%

<sup>78</sup> “Svolta nazionale della Lega, Salvini: “Basta Nord, da ora prima gli italiani””, *Il Giornale*, 21 May 2017

<sup>79</sup> Contratto per il Governo del cambiamento, p. 18-19

<sup>80</sup> Salvini: «Nuovo gruppo in Europa per la Lega con polacchi e ungheresi» - Corriere.it



However, we can generally consider this government in continuity with the traditional Italian foreign policy, despite the narrative and the rhetoric of the two majority parties<sup>81</sup>.

Probably, the only decision of this government which increased tension was the sign of the Memorandum of Understanding between Italy and China on March 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2019.

This MoU<sup>82</sup>, signed within the Chinese project of “Belt and Road Initiative”, is about cooperation on trades, infrastructure and logistic; the main concern of who was against this signature were about the vulnerability of Genoa and Trieste ports, important hub for the Chinese development project<sup>83</sup>.

This signature was criticized by Italian western allies like the US<sup>84</sup> and EU institutions<sup>85</sup>.

In the Italian centre-left, at that time parliamentary opposition, there were doubts regarding the rules and the transparency of this project<sup>86</sup>; the parliamentary group of PD in the Italian Senate presented a question to the Foreign affairs Minister asking which are the strategies of the government in international economy and affirming that China, with BRI project, is trying to assure more influence in the world<sup>87</sup>.

Few weeks before this signature, PD elected its new secretary: Nicola Zingaretti, governor of Lazio, supported by the social democratic areas of the party which were minority under the previous leadership.

In his political manifesto for the congress<sup>88</sup>, as happened for past leaders, the main issue on foreign policy was related to Europe, stressing the point of the end of austerity policies and more solidarity for the repartition of migrants.

The Democratic Party condemned the alliance between the League and the Visegrad governments, saying that it would be better for Italy to have better relations with France and Germany and with Southern Europe countries as Spain and Portugal, both led by socialist parties.

In May 2019 were held the elections for the European parliaments, gained by the League with a collapse of M5S; few months later, in August, Salvini decided to revoke the support to the government hoping that there would be general elections, probably because of the polls that, at that time, showed that League was supported by 35-40% of the voters.

Despite of his thoughts, M5S found an agreement with PD and LeU; these parties formed a new government, still led by Conte but with a very different support.

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<sup>81</sup> La politica estera del Governo giallo-verde (iai.it)

<sup>82</sup> Memorandum d'intesa tra Italia e Cina (governo.it)

<sup>83</sup> I porti di Genova e Trieste sulla Via della Seta - HuffPost Italia (huffingtonpost.it)

<sup>84</sup> L'Italia sul ring tra Usa e Cina - la Repubblica

<sup>85</sup> Nuova Via della Seta altolà Usa all'Italia E Pechino contrattacca - la Repubblica.it

<sup>86</sup> Roberta Pinotti "Genova ha riscoperto l'orgoglio ma ora ha bisogno di collegarsi al mondo" - la Repubblica.it

<sup>87</sup> Alfieri: Da governo grande confusione su Via della Seta, chiarisca in Senato | Senatori PD

<sup>88</sup> “Prima le persone” Manifesto of Nicola Zingaretti, PD Congress 2019

One of the first act of the new government was, in foreign policy, the support for the new EU nominees and the designation of Paolo Gentiloni, former Italian PM and PD member, as EU economic affairs Commissioner

In the first days of 2020, a US strike with drones<sup>89</sup> killed Qasem Soleimani, Iranian general of Quds force<sup>90</sup>; after this killing, tension rise in the Middle East<sup>91</sup> and there were reactions all over the world<sup>92</sup>.

In Italy, PD secretary Zingaretti expressed “huge concern”, asking to de-escalate<sup>93</sup>, this was also the official position of the Italian government<sup>94</sup> while MoD Lorenzo Guerini declared that Italian missions in Iraq and in the region would continue even with an increased level of security and alert. Then, the action of the government was entirely focused on the Covid-19 pandemic spread, for which Italy was one of the first and most damaged countries.

Italy entered in lockdown in March 2020 and one of the first countries that helped Italy in the most difficult days of the pandemic was the Russian Federation, which send medical aid hundreds of personnel to help Italy<sup>95</sup> in sign of solidarity<sup>96</sup>.

Called “From Russia with love”, this was the first Russian mission on NATO soil ever, and according to the President of the parliamentary committee on security (COPASIR), the main aim of it could be not only medical assistance, but also propaganda<sup>97</sup>.

On EU front, Italy asked with other member States to establish a fund for helping the European countries damaged by Covid-19 pandemic and by the consequent socio-economic crisis, called “Next Generation EU”<sup>98</sup>.

After one year of pandemic, Matteo Renzi, former leader of PD, then leader of IV, a new centrist party formed in late 2019, decided to stop supporting the government, causing the fall of it.

A new government was formed, led by Mario Draghi and sustained by both M5S, left- and right-wing parties, with the exception of FdI and some singular leftist MPs.

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<sup>89</sup> Morto Soleimani: per l'attacco usato il drone MQ-9 "Reaper" - Mondo - ANSA

<sup>90</sup> Raid Usa in Iraq, ucciso il generale iraniano Qassem Soleimani. Il Pentagono: "L'ordine partito da Trump" - la Repubblica

<sup>91</sup> Rouhani minaccia 'vendetta' per l'uccisione del generale Soleimani - LaPresse

<sup>92</sup> World reacts to US killing of Iran's Qassem Soleimani in Iraq | Soleimani assassination News | Al Jazeera

<sup>93</sup> Nicola Zingaretti su Twitter: "Grande preoccupazione per l'altissimo livello di tensione in #Iraq dopo le violenze dei giorni scorsi contro l'ambasciata Usa e l'eliminazione di #Soleimani. L'Italia e l'Europa assumano tutte le iniziative utili per scongiurare un'escalation incontrollabile nell'area"

<sup>94</sup> Conte: "In Medio Oriente l'Ue faccia sentire la sua voce per fermare l'escalation". Di Maio: "Moderazione" - la Repubblica

<sup>95</sup> В Италии число погибших с коронавирусом побило суточный рекорд — РБК (rbc.ru)

<sup>96</sup> La solidarietà russa all'Italia è senza secondi fini. Parola di Mosca (agi.it)

<sup>97</sup> Missione russa in Italia, Urso (Copasir): "Fu propaganda, non spionaggio" (yahoo.com)

<sup>98</sup> <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/it/infographics/ngeu-covid-19-recovery-package/#>

Few weeks after the formation of the new government, PD secretary Zingaretti resigned from its role and was substituted by Enrico Letta, former Italian PM, unanimously voted by the PD national assembly<sup>99</sup>.

The action of Draghi government was strictly related to internal issues, as the Covid-19 vaccination campaign and the economic recovery; on one of the most controversial foreign policy issues, the MoU signed with China, Draghi declared that it will be re-examined, the government also used golden power to stop foreign takeover on strategic companies<sup>100</sup>.

Despite of that, foreign and defence policy entered in public debate and in political agenda because of the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan<sup>101</sup> and the new seize of power made by the Taliban<sup>102</sup>.

The modalities of the withdrawal were criticized and saw as a failure for NATO and US administration<sup>103</sup>; otherwise, POTUS Biden declared that the aim of the mission in Afghanistan was destroy Al-Qaida, not nation-building<sup>104</sup>.

Huge critics to Biden were made not only by right-wing parties, worried for the risks related to terrorism<sup>105</sup>, but also by the politicians closer to the American democrats: Matteo Renzi defined the withdrawal an “historical mistake”<sup>106</sup>, while Enrico Letta<sup>107</sup> talked about an “overreaction” of the US after 9/11 but also underlined the conquests in civil rights for Afghan civil society; one important point for PD was the support for women and children and more coordination between EU countries for the welcome of refugees that escape from new Taliban regime<sup>108</sup>.

In early 2022 tensions rise between Russia and Ukraine, with an escalation after the Russian legitimization of two separatist republics in eastern Ukraine<sup>109</sup> and, on February 24<sup>th</sup>, Russian invasion of the country<sup>110</sup>.

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<sup>99</sup> <https://www.ilpost.it/2021/03/12/enrico-letta-candida-segretario-pd/>

<sup>100</sup> Draghi: addio alla 'Via della seta'. Cambia la politica estera - Rai News

<sup>101</sup> NATO - Topic: Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan (2015-2021) (Archived)

<sup>102</sup> Taliban Declares 'Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan' (businessinsider.com)

<sup>103</sup> Afghanistan troop withdrawals slammed as 'NATO's biggest debacle' | Euronews

<sup>104</sup> Factbox: Biden's speech on Afghanistan: key quotes | Reuters

<sup>105</sup> Kabul, Enrico Letta twitta: "L'Occidente ne esce a pezzi". Salvini: "Rischio terrorismo" - la Repubblica

<sup>106</sup> Renzi: "Biden ha sbagliato, niente patti con i talebani. L'Italia riapra al G20 il dossier antiterrorismo" - la Repubblica

<sup>107</sup> Letta sull'Afghanistan: "La democrazia non si può esportare con la guerra" - la Repubblica

<sup>108</sup> Afghanistan, Draghi: "Proteggeremo chi ha lavorato con noi". Di Maio disponibile riferire in Parlamento – la Repubblica

<sup>109</sup> Putin firma in diretta tv il riconoscimento delle repubbliche separatiste del Donbass (rainews.it)

<sup>110</sup> Putin announces formal start of Russia's invasion in eastern Ukraine — Meduza (archive.org)

Enrico Letta, PD leader, was one of the first and harsher in condemning Russian invasion<sup>111</sup>, saying that this event is a turning point in modern international history and that this war is not only against Ukraine but against freedom and democracy<sup>112</sup>.

The Italian government together with other Western countries, decided to react to the invasion imposing strong sanctions against Russia and providing weapons to Ukraine; in addition, the executive decided on February 24<sup>th</sup>, the renewal of Italian Armed Forces presence on NATO eastern flank in Latvia and Romania and, until September 30<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the mobilization of thousands of units in the “Very High Readiness Joint Task Force-VJTF”<sup>113</sup>.

About the furniture of weapons to Ukraine, the Italian left parties are divided: if PD, as we say, is in favour with Enrico Letta and Defence Minister Lorenzo Guerini, within LeU there are different positions: the head of the parliamentary group expressed his in-favour position<sup>114</sup> while other MPs declare their contrariety<sup>115</sup>.

In far-left parties, the Italian position was condemned, and PRC accused Mario Draghi to be a warmonger<sup>116</sup>; in the first month of war, some rallies were held with the slogan “Neither with Putin nor with NATO”<sup>117</sup>.

After a month since the starting of the war, the Italian fact-checking site “Pagella Politica” published a report that shows that Letta is the Italian political leader who writes “Putin” in his social media, while others (for example Salvini and Berlusconi) never write it<sup>118</sup>.

Related to Russian invasion, the issue of public expenditures on defence: in 2014, after North Atlantic Council in Wales was signed a declaration in which was said that Allies must spend 2% of their GDP on defence and 20% on major new equipment<sup>119</sup>; nowadays, Italy spends only 1,5% on that and the new international situation made this issue central in public debate.

On this PD was in favour<sup>120</sup>, however the leader Enrico Letta declared that the question is not the simple growth of defence budget, but the introduction of a common defence in the EU to rationalize expenditures for every single State<sup>121</sup>.

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<sup>111</sup> <https://twitter.com/EnricoLetta/status/1496733208477671426?s=20&t=AF02NKiCXzRXITbeZrDBdA>

<sup>112</sup> <https://youtu.be/EIGpaBF548M>

<sup>113</sup> Comunicato stampa del Consiglio dei Ministri n. 64 | [www.governo.it](http://www.governo.it)

<sup>114</sup> Ucraina: Fornaro, 'ok Leu su sanzioni e invio armi ma ci sia anche rilancio azione diplomatica' – Libero Quotidiano

<sup>115</sup> Fratoianni: «Grave errore inviare armi. L'Europa deve muoversi con la diplomazia» | il manifesto

<sup>116</sup> DRAGHI GUERRAFONDAIO | Rifondazione Comunista

<sup>117</sup> In migliaia a Roma contro la guerra in Ucraina. C'è chi dice: "Né con Putin né con la Nato" (fanpage.it)

<sup>118</sup> I leader di partito faticano a nominare Putin sui social | Pagella Politica

<sup>119</sup> “Wales Summit Declaration” issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, 5 September 2014

<sup>120</sup> Guerra in Ucraina, Guerini: Aumento spese militari impegno verso Nato | Sky TG24

<sup>121</sup> Ucraina, Letta: “Zelensky ha cambiato la storia. Gravi i vuoti in aula, in Italia troppi filo Putin” - la Repubblica

A different position is the one of leftist MPs, as the secretary of SI Nicola Fratoianni<sup>122</sup>, and of M5S leader and former PM Giuseppe Conte<sup>123</sup>.

Finally, another change in defence policy is the approval of EU Strategic compass on March 21<sup>st</sup>, 2022<sup>124</sup>: the main aspects of this document are the development of an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity that will allow to swiftly deploy up to 5000 troops, further develop the EU Cyber Defence Policy, more integration in intelligence field and a close partnership with other IOs, as UN and NATO, which will remain central in collective defence.

Pina Picierno, PD MEP and Vice President of the European Parliament declared that this instrument would help to reinforce democracies and European security<sup>125</sup> and Lorenzo Guerini, Defence Minister, reaffirm the commitment to create an EU collective defence<sup>126</sup>, as we have said in this paragraph one of the main objectives of Italian centre-left in the last decades.

In this paragraph we analysed the position on foreign and defence policy of left-wing parties and coalitions in Italy since the 90s; at the time this thesis is written the Russian invasion of Ukraine is still ongoing, so the situation is still in evolution and there would be possible changes in foreign and defence policy of Europe, Italy and left-wing parties.

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<sup>122</sup> "La spesa militare arrivi al 2% del Pil". La Camera vota sì, la sinistra protesta - la Repubblica

<sup>123</sup> <https://twitter.com/Mezzorainpiu/status/1508063950365245440>

<sup>124</sup> <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7371-2022-INIT/en/pdf>

<sup>125</sup> <https://twitter.com/pinapic/status/1505999719566299141>

<sup>126</sup> Il ministro Guerini: avanti con gli impegni Nato, rinnoviamo il nostro esercito per costruire la Difesa Ue - La Stampa

*VOTES IN THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT ON NATO MISSIONS. ANALYSIS BASED ON TYPE OF MISSION AND GOVERNMENT-OPPOSITION DYNAMICS*

In this paragraph there will be an analysis on how left-wing parties in Italy voted military operations. This analysis is focused on parliamentary votes in the period after 2001 and it only look at NATO missions; for every vote, it is going to be underlined the type of mission, if left-wing parties support the government or if they're opposition and, finally, if we're in presence of a key vote<sup>127</sup> or not. For this research are used the official documents and websites of Chamber of Deputies and the Parliamentary Deployment Votes Database<sup>128</sup>.

2001:

Missions' renewal<sup>129</sup> - 07/02/2001 – Government: Amato II – key vote: NO – Yes: 276 No: 7 Abstentions: 8

Within this act were present: NATO operation in the Balkans (Kosovo-Fyrom-Albania) – E.I. personnel; NATO operation in Balkans (Kosovo) – RGT. MSU C.C. Pristina; NATO operation in Balkans (Kosovo) – CP. M.P. Carabinieri Pec; NATO operation in Balkans (Albania) – CP. M.P. Carabinieri Durazzo.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
Greens	Yes	1	x	x
PdCI	Yes	8	x	x
PDS	Yes	117	x	x
PRC	No	x	7	x

<sup>127</sup> Is defined "key vote" the first approval of troops deployment

<sup>128</sup> <http://deploymentvotewatch.eu>

<sup>129</sup> <http://leg13.camera.it/docesta/313/15804/documentotesto.asp?pdI=7521&tab=1&leg=13>

Allied Harmony<sup>130</sup> – 17/10/2001 – Government: Berlusconi II – key vote: YES – Yes: 450 No: 10  
Abstentions: 0

In 2001, FYROM authorities asked NATO to help them in the process of collection and destruction of National Liberation Army weapons, spontaneously handed over.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
DS	No	107	x	x
Daisy	No	63	x	x
PdCI	No	6	x	x
PRC	No	x	8	x

2002:

Missions' renewal<sup>131</sup> – 14/02/2002 – Government: Berlusconi II – key vote: NO – Yes: 314 No: 45  
Abstentions: 4

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans; Allied Harmony; ISAF mission.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
DS	No	64	25	2
Daisy	No	37	5	1
PdCI	No	x	3	x
PRC	No	x	7	x

Missions' renewal<sup>132</sup> – 04/06/2002 – Government: Berlusconi II – key vote: NO – Yes: 382 No: 52  
Abstentions: 15

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans; Allied Harmony; ISAF mission.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
DS	No	69	30	9
Daisy	No	40	4	3
PdCI	No	1	4	x
PRC	No	x	7	x

<sup>130</sup> [https://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op\\_int\\_concluse/FyromALLIED\\_HARMONY/Pagine/default.aspx](https://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op_int_concluse/FyromALLIED_HARMONY/Pagine/default.aspx)

<sup>131</sup> [http://leg14.camera.it/\\_dati/leg14/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera\\_wai.asp?PDL=2254](http://leg14.camera.it/_dati/leg14/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera_wai.asp?PDL=2254)

<sup>132</sup> [http://leg14.camera.it/\\_dati/leg14/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera\\_wai.asp?PDL=2666](http://leg14.camera.it/_dati/leg14/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera_wai.asp?PDL=2666)

2003:

Missions' renewal<sup>133</sup> – 20/02/2003 – Government: Berlusconi II – key vote: NO – Yes: 322 No: 11  
Abstention: 11

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans; Allied Harmony; ISAF mission.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
DS	No	69	x	8
Daisy	No	34	x	1
PdCI	No	1	2	2
PRC	No	x	6	x

Iraq war<sup>134</sup> – 24/07/2003 – Government: Berlusconi II – key vote: YES – Yes: 229 No: 131  
Abstention: 8

Despite the Iraq war was not under NATO command, in article 7 of this law was present also the renewal of other missions like the one in Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO HQ Skopje in FYROM, NATO HQ Tirana in Albania, Active Endeavour and ISAF.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
DS	No	x	78	x
Daisy	No	x	30	3
PdCI	No	x	6	x
PRC	No	x	6	x

2004:

Missions' renewal<sup>135</sup> - 10/03/2004 – Government: Berlusconi II – key vote: NO – Yes: 281 No: 64  
Abstentions: 12

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans, NATO HQs in Skopje and Tirana, Active Endeavour and ISAF.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
DS	No	x	39	x
Daisy	No	x	1	x
PdCI	No	x	7	x
PRC	No	x	11	x

<sup>133</sup> [http://leg14.camera.it/\\_dati/leg14/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera\\_wai.asp?PDL=3564](http://leg14.camera.it/_dati/leg14/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera_wai.asp?PDL=3564)

<sup>134</sup> <https://www.camera.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:camera-it:parlamento:scheda.progetto.legge:camera;14.legislatura;4154>

<sup>135</sup> [http://leg14.camera.it/\\_dati/leg14/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera\\_wai.asp?PDL=4725](http://leg14.camera.it/_dati/leg14/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera_wai.asp?PDL=4725)



Missions' renewal<sup>136</sup> – 13/07/2004 – Government: Berlusconi II – key vote: YES – Yes: 253 No: 207 Abstentions: 3

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans, NATO HQs in Skopje and Tirana, Active Endeavour, ISAF and a humanitarian mission in Iraq of stabilization and to support local Government<sup>137</sup>.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
DS	No	x	121	x
Daisy	No	x	54	x
PdCI	No	x	8	x
PRC	No	x	8	x

2005:

Missions' renewal<sup>138</sup> – 15/03/2005 – Government: Berlusconi II – key vote: NO – Yes: 350 No: 19 Abstentions: 2

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans, NATO HQs in Skopje and Tirana, Active Endeavour, ISAF.

Parl. Group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
DS	No	97	x	x
Daisy	No	45	x	x
PdCI	No	x	6	x
PRC	No	x	6	x

<sup>136</sup> [http://leg14.camera.it/\\_dati/leg14/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera\\_wai.asp?PDL=5088](http://leg14.camera.it/_dati/leg14/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera_wai.asp?PDL=5088)

<sup>137</sup> In the same day was voted another law (208/2004), in which this mission wasn't present and just with the renewal of pre-existent missions, supported even by DS (116 yes) and Daisy (60 yes). PdCI and PRC voted in the same way.

<sup>138</sup> [http://leg14.camera.it/\\_dati/leg14/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera\\_wai.asp?PDL=5594](http://leg14.camera.it/_dati/leg14/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera_wai.asp?PDL=5594)

Missions' renewal<sup>139</sup> – 12/07/2005 – Government: Berlusconi III – key vote: NO – Yes: 403 No: 22  
Abstentions: 4

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans, NATO HQs in Skopje and Tirana, Active Endeavour, ISAF.

Parl. Group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
DS	No	95	5	2
Daisy	No	61	x	x
PdCI	No	1	5	x
PRC	No	x	7	x

2006:

Missions' renewal<sup>140</sup> – 19/07/2006 – Government: Prodi II – key vote: NO – Yes: 549 No: 4  
Abstentions: 0

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans, NATO HQs in Skopje and Tirana, Active Endeavour, ISAF; NATO Training Mission (NTM) in Iraq.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
FdV	Yes	16	x	x
IdV	Yes	16	x	x
PD	Yes	189	x	x
PdCI	Yes	14	x	x
PRC	Yes	34	4	x

<sup>139</sup> [http://leg14.camera.it/\\_dati/leg14/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera\\_wai.asp?PDL=5948](http://leg14.camera.it/_dati/leg14/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera_wai.asp?PDL=5948)

<sup>140</sup> [http://leg15.camera.it/\\_dati/leg15/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera\\_wai.asp?PDL=1288](http://leg15.camera.it/_dati/leg15/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera_wai.asp?PDL=1288)

2007:

Missions' renewal<sup>141</sup> – 08/03/2007 – Government: Prodi II – key vote: NO – Yes: 524 No: 3

Abstentions: 19

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans, Active Endeavour, ISAF; NATO Training Mission (NTM) in Iraq.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
FdV	Yes	14	x	x
IdV	Yes	14	x	x
PD	Yes	195	x	x
PdCI	Yes	15	x	x
PRC	Yes	36	2	x

2008:

Missions' renewal<sup>142</sup> – 21/02/2008 – Government: Prodi II – key vote: NO – Yes: 340 No: 50

Abstentions: 1

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans, Active Endeavour, ISAF.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
IdV	Yes	11	x	x
PD	Yes	138	1	x
PdCI	Yes	x	15	x
PRC	Yes	x	32	x

2009:

Missions' renewal<sup>143</sup> – 21/01/2009 – Government: Berlusconi IV – key vote: NO – Yes: 485 No: 2

Abstentions: 4

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans, Active Endeavour, ISAF.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
IdV	No	20	x	1
PD	No	181	x	3

<sup>141</sup> [http://leg15.camera.it/\\_dati/leg15/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera\\_wai.asp?PDL=2193](http://leg15.camera.it/_dati/leg15/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera_wai.asp?PDL=2193)

<sup>142</sup> [http://leg15.camera.it/\\_dati/leg15/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera\\_wai.asp?PDL=3395](http://leg15.camera.it/_dati/leg15/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera_wai.asp?PDL=3395)

<sup>143</sup> [https://documenti.camera.it/leg16/dossier/Testi/D08209\\_0.htm](https://documenti.camera.it/leg16/dossier/Testi/D08209_0.htm)

Missions' renewal<sup>144</sup> – 28/07/2009 – Government: Berlusconi IV – key vote: NO – Yes: 285 No: 250  
 Abstentions: 0

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans, Active Endeavour, ISAF, NTM Iraq.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
IdV	No	x	26	x
PD	No	x	192	x

Missions' renewal<sup>145</sup> – 17/12/2009 – Government: Berlusconi IV – key vote: NO – Yes: 460 No: 0  
 Abstentions: 22

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans, Active Endeavour, ISAF.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
IdV	No	x	x	15
PD	No	158	x	5

2010:

Missions' renewal<sup>146</sup> – 03/03/2010 – Government: Berlusconi IV – key vote: NO – Yes: 460 No: 2  
 Abstentions: 30

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans, Active Endeavour, ISAF.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
IdV	No	x	x	18
PD	No	175	x	8

Missions' renewal<sup>147</sup> – 21/07/2010 – Government: Berlusconi IV – key vote: NO – Yes: 484 No: 25  
 Abstentions: 11

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans, Active Endeavour, ISAF.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
IdV	No	x	22	x
PD	No	174	x	9

<sup>144</sup> <https://leg16.camera.it/126?tab=&leg=16&idDocumento=2602&sede=&tipo=>

<sup>145</sup> <https://leg16.camera.it/126?leg=16&pdl=3016>

<sup>146</sup> <https://leg16.camera.it/126?leg=16&pdl=3097>

<sup>147</sup> <https://leg16.camera.it/126?leg=16&pdl=3610>

2011:

Missions' renewal<sup>148</sup> – 25/01/2011 – Government: Berlusconi IV – key vote: NO – Yes: 479 No: 19  
Abstentions: 1

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans, Active Endeavour, ISAF.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
IdV	No	x	18	x
PD	No	175	x	x

Unified Protector<sup>149</sup> – 24/03/2011 – Government: Berlusconi IV – key vote: YES – Yes: 300 No: 293  
Abstentions: 2

NATO military operation in Lybia enforcing UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973 in the context of  
Lybian Civil War<sup>150</sup>.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
IdV	No	x	21	x
PD	No	x	199	x

Missions' renewal<sup>151</sup> – 02/08/2011 – Government: Berlusconi IV – key vote: NO – Yes: 493 No: 22  
Abstentions: 15

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans, Active Endeavour, ISAF, Operation  
Unified Protector.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
IdV	No	x	21	x
PD	No	170	x	9

<sup>148</sup> <https://leg16.camera.it/126?leg=16&pdl=3996>

<sup>149</sup> [https://leg16.camera.it/410?idSeduta=0452&tipo=alfabetico\\_stenografico](https://leg16.camera.it/410?idSeduta=0452&tipo=alfabetico_stenografico)

<sup>150</sup> [https://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op\\_int\\_conclude/Libia-UnifiedProtector/Pagine/default.aspx](https://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op_int_conclude/Libia-UnifiedProtector/Pagine/default.aspx)

<sup>151</sup> <https://leg16.camera.it/126?leg=16&pdl=4551>

2012:

Missions' renewal<sup>152</sup> – 01/02/2012 – Government: Monti – key vote: NO – Yes: 415 No: 72  
Abstentions: 11

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans, Active Endeavour, ISAF.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
IdV	No	x	18	x
PD	Yes	173	2	6

2013:

Missions' renewal<sup>153</sup> – 22/01/2013 – Government: Monti – key vote: NO – Yes: 384 No: 24  
Abstentions: 13

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans, Active Endeavour, ISAF, Ocean Shield.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
IdV	No	1	11	1
PD	Yes	170	4	7

Missions' renewal<sup>154</sup> – 04/12/2013 – Government: Letta – key vote: NO – Yes: 324 No: 132  
Abstentions: 11

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans, ISAF, Ocean Shield.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
PD	Yes	229	1	1
SEL	No	x	26	x

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<sup>152</sup> <https://leg16.camera.it/126?leg=16&pdl=4864>

<sup>153</sup> <https://leg16.camera.it/126?leg=16&pdl=5713>

<sup>154</sup> <https://www.camera.it/leg17/126?leg=17&idDocumento=1670>

2014:

Missions' renewal<sup>155</sup> – 13/03/2014 – Government: Renzi – key vote: NO – Yes: 283 No: 89  
Abstentions: 1

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans, Active Endeavour, ISAF, Ocean Shield.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
PD	Yes	225	1	x
SEL	No	x	15	x

Missions' renewal<sup>156</sup> – 17/09/2014 – Government: Renzi – key vote: NO – Yes: 315 No: 130  
Abstentions: 11

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans, Active Endeavour, ISAF, Ocean Shield.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
PD	Yes	237	1	x
SEL	No	x	19	x

2015:

Missions' renewal<sup>157</sup> – 31/03/2015 – Government: Renzi – key vote: NO – Yes: 253 No: 50  
Abstentions: 2

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans, Active Endeavour, ISAF, Baltic Air Policing, Resolute Support.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
PD	Yes	213	x	x
SEL	No	x	9	x

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<sup>155</sup> <https://www.camera.it/leg17/126?leg=17&idDocumento=2149>

<sup>156</sup> <https://www.camera.it/leg17/126?leg=17&idDocumento=2598>

<sup>157</sup> <https://www.camera.it/leg17/126?leg=17&idDocumento=2893>

Missions' renewal<sup>158</sup> – 19/11/2015 – Government: Renzi – key vote: NO – Yes: 319 No: 103

Abstentions: 13

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans, Active Endeavour, Baltic Air Policing, Resolute Support.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
PD	Yes	226	1	x
SEL	No	x	27	x

2016:

Missions' renewal<sup>159</sup> – 06/07/2016 – Government: Renzi – key vote: NO – Yes: 225 No: 71

Abstentions: 0

Within this act were present: NATO operations in the Balkans, Resolute Support.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
PD	Yes	189	x	x
SEL	No	x	12	x

2017:

In March 2017 was voted a resolution on missions' renewal presented by PD member Garofani and others<sup>160</sup>: this was not voted with a unique vote but divided in different part<sup>161</sup>.

We analyse here just the votes regarding NATO operations.

NATO Joint Enterprise – 08/03/2017 – Government: Gentiloni – key vote: NO – Yes: 337 No: 90

Abstentions: 11

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
Art. 1/MDP	No	x	31	x
PD	Yes	202	x	x
SEL	No	x	9	x

<sup>158</sup> <https://www.camera.it/leg17/126?leg=17&idDocumento=3393>

<sup>159</sup> <https://www.camera.it/leg17/126?leg=17&idDocumento=3953>

<sup>160</sup> <https://storia.camera.it/documenti/indirizzo-e-controllo/20180117-6-00382-risoluzione-assemblea-6-00382-presentata-garofani-francesco-saverio-partito>

<sup>161</sup> <https://www.camera.it/leg17/410?idSeduta=0755&tipo=votazioni>



NATO Iceland – 08/03/2017 – Government: Gentiloni – key vote: NO – Yes: 333 No: 101  
 Abstentions: 0

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
Art. 1/MDP	No	15	12	x
PD	Yes	199	x	x
SEL	No	x	9	x

NATO Sea Guardian – 08/07/2017 – Government: Gentiloni – key vote: NO – Yes: 414 No: 15  
 Abstentions: 0

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
Art. 1/MDP	No	20	5	x
PD	Yes	202	x	x
SEL	No	x	9	x

NATO Resolute Support – 08/03/2017 – Government: Gentiloni – key vote: NO – Yes: 309 No: 105  
 Abstentions: 16

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
Art. 1/MDP	No	24	5	x
PD	Yes	201	x	x
SEL	No	x	9	x

NATO Active Fence and Baltic Guardian – 08/03/2017 – Government: Gentiloni – key vote: NO –  
 Yes: 321 No: 94 Abstentions: 18

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
Art. 1/MDP	No	21	4	x
PD	Yes	201	x	x
SEL	No	x	9	x

NATO Enhanced Forward Presence – 08/03/2017 – Government: Gentiloni – key vote: NO – Yes: 295 No: 129 Abstentions: 14

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
Art. 1/MDP	No	31	x	x
PD	Yes	204	x	x
SEL	No	9	x	x

NATO Enhanced Air Policing Bulgaria – 08/03/2017 – Government: Gentiloni – key vote: NO – Yes: 322 No: 97 Abstentions: 17

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
Art. 1/MDP	No	31	x	x
PD	Yes	199	x	x
SEL	No	9	x	x

NATO Interim Air Policing Iceland – 08/03/2017 – Government: Gentiloni – key vote: NO – Yes: 312 No: 97 Abstentions: 16

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
Art. 1/MDP	No	23	6	x
PD	Yes	202	x	x
SEL	No	x	9	x

2018:

In January 2018 was voted a resolution on missions' renewal presented by PD member Garofani and others<sup>162</sup>: this was not voted with a unique vote but divided in different part<sup>163</sup>.

We analyse here just the votes regarding NATO operations.

NATO Joint Enterprise – 17/01/2018 – Government: Gentiloni – key vote: NO – Yes: 351 No: 134  
Abstentions: 25

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
Art. 1/MDP	No	x	35	1
PD	Yes	239	x	1
SEL	No	x	16	x

NATO Sea Guardian – 17/01/2018 – Government: Gentiloni – key vote: NO – Yes: 432 No: 56  
Abstentions: 24

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
Art. 1/MDP	No	x	35	1
PD	Yes	240	x	x
SEL	No	x	17	x

NATO Resolute Support, Active Fence and South-East Border Air Surveillance – 17/01/2018 –  
Government: Gentiloni – key vote: NO – Yes: 351 No: 132 Abstentions: 25

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
Art. 1/MDP	No	x	34	1
PD	Yes	239	x	1
SEL	No	x	17	x

<sup>162</sup> [https://www.camera.it/leg17/410?idSeduta=0905&tipo=documenti\\_seduta](https://www.camera.it/leg17/410?idSeduta=0905&tipo=documenti_seduta)

<sup>163</sup> <https://www.camera.it/leg17/410?idSeduta=0905&tipo=votazioni>

NATO South Border and Enhanced Force Presence (Latvia) – 17/01/2018 – Government: Gentiloni  
 – key vote: NO – Yes: 355 No: 128 Abstentions: 24

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
Art. 1/MDP	No	x	35	1
PD	Yes	239	x	1
SEL	No	x	17	x

Support for Afghan Police Forces – 17/01/2018 – Government: Gentiloni – key vote: NO – Yes: 402  
 No: 80 Abstentions: 24

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
Art. 1/MDP	No	34	x	1
PD	Yes	239	x	1
SEL	No	16	x	x

2019:

In July 2019 was voted a resolution on missions' renewal presented by M5S member Iovino and others<sup>164</sup>: this was not voted with a unique vote but divided in different part<sup>165</sup>.

We analyse here just the votes regarding NATO operations.

NATO Joint Enterprise, Mission in Iraq, Air Policing, Support to Afghan Forces – 03/07/2019 –  
 Government: Conte I – key vote: NO – Yes: 505 No: 0 Abstentions: 0

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
LeU	No	12	x	x
PD	No	96	x	x

NATO Sea Guardian, Resolute Support, Support Turkey, Southeast Border, Southern border,  
 Enhanced Forward Presence – 03/07/2019 – Government: Conte I – key vote: NO – Yes: 494 No: 13  
 Abstentions: 0

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
LeU	No	1	12	x
PD	No	96	x	x

<sup>164</sup> [https://www.camera.it/leg18/410?idSeduta=0202&tipo=documenti\\_seduta](https://www.camera.it/leg18/410?idSeduta=0202&tipo=documenti_seduta)

<sup>165</sup> <https://www.camera.it/leg18/410?idSeduta=0202&tipo=votazioni>

2020:

In July 2020 was voted a resolution on missions' renewal presented by M5S member Iovino and others<sup>166</sup>: this was not voted with a unique vote but divided in different part<sup>167</sup>.

We analyse here just the votes regarding NATO operations.

NATO Joint Enterprise, Sea Guardian, Resolute Support, Mission in Iraq, Enhanced Forward Presence, Air Policing, Implementation of the Enhancement of the Framework for the South – 16/07/2020 – Government: Conte II – key vote: NO – Yes: 453 No: 0 Abstentions: 9

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
LeU	Yes	4	x	3
PD	Yes	74	x	x

2021:

In July 2021 was voted a resolution on missions' renewal presented by IV member Migliore and others<sup>168</sup>: this was not voted with a unique vote but divided in different part<sup>169</sup>.

We analyse here just the votes regarding NATO operations.

NATO Joint Enterprise, Sea Guardian, Resolute Support<sup>170</sup>, Mission in Iraq, Enhanced Forward Presence, Air Policing, Implementation of the Enhancement of the Framework for the South – 15/07/2021 – Government: Draghi – key vote: NO – Yes: 438 No: 2 Abstentions: 2

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
LeU	Yes	10	x	x
PD	Yes	70	x	x

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<sup>166</sup> [https://www.camera.it/leg18/410?idSeduta=0373&tipo=documenti\\_seduta](https://www.camera.it/leg18/410?idSeduta=0373&tipo=documenti_seduta)

<sup>167</sup> <https://www.camera.it/leg18/410?idSeduta=0373&tipo=votazioni>

<sup>168</sup> <https://aic.camera.it/aic/scheda.html?numero=6-00194&ramo=C&leg=18>

<sup>169</sup> <https://www.camera.it/leg18/410?idSeduta=0541&tipo=votazioni>

<sup>170</sup> The mission ended in Summer 2021; in September 2021 the Italian Government modified the part of the decree regarding the refinancing of missions in Afghanistan from the support to Afghan police and armed forces to humanitarian aid for refugees.

2022:

Urgent measures for Ukraine Crisis<sup>171</sup> – 17/03/2022 – Government: Draghi – key vote: YES –  
Yes: 367 No: 25 Abstentions: 5

Within this decree, presented by the Italian government after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, are present: missions' renewal of NATO Enhanced Forward Presence, Air Policing, Implementation of the Enhancement of the Framework for the South; it is authorized until September 30<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the participation of several units of Italian Armed Forces to the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF).

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
LeU	Yes	3	1	1
PD	Yes	68	x	1

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<sup>171</sup> <https://www.camera.it/leg18/126?tab=2&leg=18&idDocumento=3491&sede=&tipo=>

## *INTERVIEW WITH ROBERTA PINOTTI*

Interview with Sen. Roberta Pinotti, former Defence Minister (2014-2018) and Chair of Defence Committee in Italian Senate (2020-2022)

*1) In the Italian Democratic Party, created in 2007 with the unification process of post-communists, social democrats, liberals and ex-Christian democrats, there were party leaders with different cultural and ideological backgrounds; is it possible to underline some differences in foreign and defence policy between these leaders? How and when did the leaderships change Party's positions?*

The PD project is based on the union of three great traditions of Italian political thought, the Catholic-democratic, the secular-socialist and environmentalist tradition. The synthesis has certainly required on many issues an effort of reflection and comparison that has produced the Values' Manifesto of the Democratic Party. On the issues of defence and security policy there has generally been a shared line not only within the PD but also in a bipartisan key. It is a fact that even in a rather unstable political framework, with short-term executives, there has always been a large majority on defence and security policy and the strategic direction has never been the subject of a significant discontinuity. This is because at the base of our security and defence policy there are some basic choices: the first concerns the international position of Italy, firmly anchored to the choice of being part of the European Union, NATO and to the principles of the United Nations. The second concerns the role assumed by our country in assuming responsibility in the management of crises and conflicts in order to protect international peace and stability. A choice from which derives the more than thirty-year participation of our contingents in international missions and which expresses, in line with the dictates of our Constitutional Charter, the commitment of our country to contribute to an international order based on peace and an international community based on law.

There were few exceptions to the almost unanimous consent to participate in international missions: the mission in Iraq "Ancient Babylon" of 2004, decided by the Berlusconi government, a mission that must be framed in the phase of the doctrine of preventive and permanent war of Bush and started without authorization from the UN, which saw the opposition of Democrats of the Left, Margherita, Sdi Udeur, Rifondazione Comunista and Pdcì.

*2) The plurality of positions is considered as a value (Art. 1.8 of Party's statute); nowadays, regarding foreign and defence policy issues is there a plurality of positions? When you were Defence Minister since 2014 to 2018, in which occasions did these differences emerge?*

Even the period from 2014 to 2018 did not see significant distinctions even if it was characterized by two very complex challenges from the point of view of security for the West and for Italy: having to face the threat of jihadist extremism, which had upset Europe and the whole world, and the crisis linked to migration flows that saw Italy, first with Mare Nostrum then with Mare Sicuro, to assume alone burdens and responsibilities in the fight against traffickers and in the rescue of tens of thousands of human lives. Then came the involvement of the European Union with the Triton and then Sophia missions.

*3) You had top roles in both Government and Parliament, which are the different prerogatives and, on the contrary, which are the similarities of the two offices of Minister and Committee's Chair?*

These are different roles with different tasks: the Minister sits in the Council of Ministers, has an executive role and is responsible for defining the objectives and programs to be implemented, with a function of guidance and control over the compliance of the results of administrative management with the general directives given according to the government lines defined by the Prime Minister and Parliament. The Chairman of the Committee promotes and organizes the parliamentary work of his committee, he is a figure of guarantee that protects the proper conduct of parliamentary work. It is, therefore, a key element of the planning and conduct of work and of the Government-Parliament dialectic.

*4) This thesis analysed the case of Italy and Spain; what can we say about the cooperation in foreign and defence policy between these countries?*

Spain is already a strategic partner for Italy, due to its common membership of NATO and the EU, the geographical position that makes the Mediterranean central and the sharing of the perspective of common European defence. It is also one of the privileged partners of our country, together with France and Germany in the so-called "quater format", to start, even in the short term, concrete integration initiatives. Russia's attack on Ukraine has given a significant turning point to the debate on European defence issues. In the face of new instabilities, the construction of a common foreign and defence policy is now essential to make the Union a credible player on the international stage. Today we are at a key moment for the future of Europe's strategic capacity. It is therefore likely - and highly desirable - a qualitative leap in the agreements and instruments with which Italy, Spain and all the Member States act to guarantee the integrity and well-being of our societies and to protect human



rights, democracy and the rule of law. In this direction we could benefit from the momentum of the instruments already launched by the EU Commission. Specifically in defense, the two countries collaborate on some of the main investment programs in both NATO and the EU, including the Eurofighter, the NH-90 helicopters, the European Male Rpas drone.

Cooperation in the field of defence has had a decisive impetus in recent years thanks to the Pesco-4 initiative, with which, in May 2020, Italy and Spain, together with France and Germany, outlined and promoted a common political-strategic vision of the process of strengthening cooperation within the COMMUNITY in the field of defence. In this regard, it should also be remembered the important function played by the financing instruments implemented by the EU, such as the EDF European Defense Fund and the EDIDP program, which have been factors in accelerating Italy-Spain cooperation, which today collaborate in 7 programs (of the 9 with Italian participation), including, in addition to those already mentioned, it should be remembered that Spain joins the Italian-French European Patrol Corvette program, which today appears to be a European cooperative procurement model capable of contributing to the competitiveness of the European defence industry also towards non-EU markets.

## *INTERVIEW WITH VITO VATTUONE*

Interview with Sen. Vito Vattuone, member of Defence Committee in the Italian Senate (2013 – 2022) and member of the Italian delegation in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

*1) In the Italian Democratic Party, created in 2007 with the unification process of post-communists, social democrats, liberals and ex-Christian democrats, there were party leaders with different cultural and ideological backgrounds; is it possible to underline some differences in foreign and defence policy between these leaders? How and when did the leaderships change Party's positions?*  
The alternation in the leadership of the PD from different political backgrounds has never given rise to any discontinuity as regards foreign and defence policy guidelines.

This is because all the formations that merged into the PD in October 2007, the Left Democrats, Daisy – the heir of the Italian People's Party – and other reformist and democratic Catholicism forces, from the European Republicans to the Reformist Alliance, had long since matured and sedimented a decisive multilateralist option on these issues, contributing to inscribing our national defence design in a broader design, in the design of the defence policy of the great western democracies and multilateral organisations to which we belong, first and foremost the United Nations, the European Union and NATO, with the aim of protecting international stability, human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Indeed, it can be said that this choice now represents a set of lines of political action and political culture that represent an option that cannot be renounced not only for the PD, but for our country. Looking at the positions expressed in Parliament, it can be said that our country's foreign, defence and security policy enjoys a special status: on these issues a broad convergence has always been sought and obtained beyond the majority-opposition schema.

Because it is normal for a great democracy to present a united front when discussing its defence and international positioning and projection.

*2) Regarding Russian invasion of Ukraine, from the very beginning the Democratic Party adopted a very strong position condemning Russia; how this war is changing the foreign policy of the Party? Which are the main differences and similarities within PES members and, in Italy, between Democratic Party and Five Star Movement on this and how this event is affecting relations among these parties?*

Few events like the Russian aggression against Ukraine have been able to change the balance of the planet and the entire structure of international relations so rapidly and profoundly. The war against

Ukraine has introduced an unprecedented contrast between democracies and autocracies and a heightened polarisation that appears destined to continue for a long time. The PD's position could only be on the side of the aggressed and in defence of international legality, as well as that of the Draghi government. Moreover, the condemnation of the aggression against Ukraine, with the annexed sanctions and military measures, was fully shared within the EU, NATO and the G7, sending the Russian Federation a clear and fundamental message of firmness, cohesion and unity. There were no dissenting voices in the PSE: even the M5S condemnation of the invasion was clear, despite having a more open attitude to Russia in the past, particularly with regard to the events of 2014.

*3) Analysing parliamentary debates and votes on NATO missions, there are different theories about drivers (if a Party is member of the Government or opposition, or the type of mission); according to you, which are the main drivers followed by Democratic Party?*

NATO, as a predominantly military alliance, has had easier access to the knowledge, that the Alliance exists and has a role, only and if it succeeds in updating the foundations on which it is built, thus bringing them up to date with changes in the international scenario. It has cyclically faced geographic and strategic adjustment processes and is therefore more accustomed to and able to adapt. For this reason, NATO has often been able to act as a driving force for the integration of the defence policies and military capabilities of its member countries, the progressive harmonisation of which has been largely due to their common membership of NATO.

Now, in the face of the current framework, with the Madrid summit, NATO has returned to its original function: the collective defence of the Euro-Atlantic area.

And while this confirms the Alliance as the pillar of collective defence in Europe, it leaves room for a division of tasks with the European Union, in a logic of complementarity and not duplication. In fact, the issue of crisis and conflict prevention and management, which require not only military capabilities, but also other instruments, stabilisation measures, such as post-crisis reconstruction, institutional strengthening, and support for the reconstruction of a country's economic and social fabric, is entirely different.

*4) This thesis analysed the case of Italy and Spain; what can we say about the cooperation in foreign and defence policy between these countries?*

Spain, as a NATO and EU member, is a strategic partner for Italy. It is also one of our country's privileged partners, together with France and Germany. (so-called quater format), to launch, even in the short term and within the framework of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), concrete integration initiatives.

*5) Why, according to you, there is very low interest in public opinion regarding this issue? Foreign and defence policies are more relevant in public debate after the war in Ukraine?*

In Italy, it is traditionally difficult to talk about defence and security policy: these are complex issues that require long-term policies and therefore long-term capabilities and perspectives. Instead, the chronic situation of political-institutional instability, as well as a lack of habit, or poor propensity, for long-term assessments, have historically diminished attention to these issues. There is also a widespread perception that what concerns defence and security systems and therefore military spending is far removed from the real and essential interests of citizens. It is a wrong and dangerous perception that still influences and conditions part of the political class. Conversely, contributing to global governance, to international stability, is essential for development and prosperity. To say nothing of the fact that the commitment to human rights, democratic development and the peaceful coexistence of peoples is independent of economic assessments. I think it is important to make it clear that while security certainly has a cost, insecurity costs much more. There is no doubt that since 24 February, the global scenario has changed; and it has changed in the direction of greater conflict and in particular greater confrontation with Russia and China, which will have effects in many areas of the planet. This has prompted all EU member states to announce an increase in military spending to cope with the new geopolitical situation and strengthen security, while waiting for the common defence project to finally take off.

*6) In recent years was developed the concept of Enlarged Mediterranean; according to PD, what could be the role and the aims of Italy in this area? Is this area still a priority even after the Russian invasion of Ukraine?*

The Mediterranean is an area of priority interest for Italian external action, and this in both the EU and NATO contexts. It is a region where the repercussions of the Russian aggression against Ukraine are already being felt, which has abruptly redirected - and it could not have been otherwise - the attention of the EU and NATO from the southern to the eastern flank.

It should be emphasised that if today's crisis started on the eastern flank, once again, the Mediterranean has thus become the playing field where the consequences of this war are most visible and tangible for Europe and where prospects and cooperation are once again at risk. After 24 February, we find ourselves once again in a highly unstable situation. The current conflict has not diverted Russian and Chinese attention away from the African continent, its fragilities and opportunities, and as a result, Africa today is one of the areas of energy, technological and geopolitical confrontation and competition. We know how the threats coming from the southern shore are extremely complex and heterogeneous, quite different from the deterrence required in Eastern

Europe. The Libyan framework, the countries of the Sahel or the Horn of Africa are obviously theatres characterised by a high degree of complexity and criticality that require multidimensional capabilities and tools, not limited to the military aspect. Within this framework, it will be up to the countries most involved in the Mediterranean area - and first and foremost Italy - to take on a more proactive and effective role on the southern flank, both within NATO and, above all, within the European Union. This is an essential factor if one does not want to assume the role of passive spectator with respect to the prevailing dynamics at the Euro-Atlantic level.

## THE CASE OF SPAIN

### *FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY OF PSOE (SPANISH SOCIALIST WORKERS' PARTY)*

As we have seen in Chapter 1, the main change in foreign and defence policy for Spanish socialists was made in the 80s, when the party shifted its position towards NATO from being against the Alliance's membership to a favourable position.

Similarly to the Chapter regarding Italy, despite this thesis analysed parliamentary votes on NATO missions after 2001, is opinion of who's writing to premises the foreign policy of PSOE in the 90s, when there were the first NATO interventions in history in the context of Yugoslavian wars.

During that time NATO SG was Javier Solana, one of the most important members of Spanish Socialist's Party<sup>1</sup>.

The Armed Forces of Spain were involved since the beginning of military operations in the Balkans: in 1992, when the frigate *Extremadura* was part of the naval mission to control the respect of the sanctions against Yugoslavia, and in August 1995, during the air strikes made also by Spanish F18<sup>2</sup>. Is important to remember that in these years the Government of Spain was led by the PSOE and the Prime Minister was Felipe Gonzalez; on the other hand, during the military operation in 1999 there was a new majority in the country and the new PM was Jose Maria Aznar, member of the Popular Party.

Generally, we could say that the strong majority of Spanish parties, with the exception of IU (United Left), supported the involvement of the country in this war; but this parliamentary support didn't reflect, at that time, the public opinion: just the 40% was in favour, while the 45% was against<sup>3</sup>.

The first elections of the new century were held on March 2000 and were won by the centre-right that maintained power.

The PSOE in its electoral manifesto<sup>4</sup> proudly underlined the role of Gonzalez governments in foreign policy after the decades of isolationism under Franco and at the same time attacked Aznar and his policy, considered the cause of a secondary role of Spain in Europe and in the transatlantic community.

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<sup>1</sup> Solana ordena el bombardeo de Serbia | Internacional | EL PAÍS (elpais.com)

<sup>2</sup> Avilés Farré J., España, la OTAN, y los conflictos de la antigua Yugoslavia

<sup>3</sup> CIS: Estudio 2324: barometro de abril 1999

<sup>4</sup> Programa-Electoral-Generales-2000.pdf (psoe.es)

PSOE was in favour of an increased cooperation in the field of security and defence policy at a EU level and was also favourable to participating in peacekeeping operations and to a major involvement in NATO action.

At the same time, importance was given to peace and stabilization process in Middle East, a region that became central after 9/11 terrorists' attacks and the following Western intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq.

During these years in between 2000 and 2004, PSOE were at the opposition of Aznar and its policies, including a foreign policy considered one of the closest in Europe, along with United Kingdom, to US Bush administration<sup>5</sup>.

In 2004, few weeks before Spanish general elections, Aznar was interviewed by British newspaper The Times and he declared that the position of France and Germany, countries that didn't intervene in Iraq, of making the EU a global counterweight to America was a "dangerous fantasy"<sup>6</sup>; this was considered wrong by the PSOE: according to Miguel Ángel Moratinos, who would be appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs by Zapatero, Aznar wanted to maintain Spain "on the sidelines of Europe"<sup>7</sup> and the PSOE campaign adopted the slogan "Return to Europe" in these elections.

Few days before the general elections in Madrid there was a terrorist attack in which 192 people died and thousands were wounded. Despite the government initially accused ETA, it was soon clear that the group responsible of the attacks was Al Qaeda.

Three days later the PSOE, supported by 43% of voters, won the general elections and Zapatero was named new Prime Minister after almost a decade of centre-right government<sup>8</sup>.

According to some analysts, the legacy of the terrorist's attacks was important in deciding the outcome of elections since Aznar foreign policy on Iraq was considered one of the main causes of why Al Qaeda decided to attack Spain.

The socialist electoral manifesto of 2004 is the first analysed in this thesis in which foreign and defence policies are so detailed and put in the first pages<sup>9</sup>.

The party accused neoconservatives to refuse to acknowledge the role of multilateral institutions but to use them as an instrument to legitimate the use of force; for PSOE, EU countries and institutions must promote a new, strengthen multilateralism to face the challenges of the new century as globalization and terrorism.

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<sup>5</sup> Ak, M. F. (2009). *From Aznar to Zapatero: discontinuity in the Spanish foreign policy* (Master's thesis, Middle East Technical University)

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/aznar-hits-at-europes-loss-of-direction-62ldmj5tvk2>

<sup>7</sup> Ak, M. F. (2009). *From Aznar to Zapatero: discontinuity in the Spanish foreign policy* (Master's thesis, Middle East Technical University)

<sup>8</sup> Elecciones Generales 2004 | elmundo.es

<sup>9</sup> <http://web.psoe.es/source-media/000000348500/000000348570.pdf>

Also, the importance of human rights and the growth of humanitarian aid to third countries were stressed in the manifesto, along with a project of closer cooperation with the Mediterranean countries, both from Europe and Northern Africa.

On security and defence issues is where the PSOE disagreed the most with PP: the priority for Socialists was to implement a European defence policy and to enhance cooperation within EU member countries, not in contrast but complementary to NATO and transatlantic relations with the US, despite this should not be supported unconditionally as Aznar did in the context of Iraq War.

PSOE also proposed a reform of the Armed Forces, which needed to be modernized according to them and, maybe the most relevant thing for the issues of this thesis, a more relevant and central role of the Parliament in authorizing international missions.

Finally, according to PSOE Spanish foreign policy must be focused on areas like South America<sup>10</sup>, where there are countries historically and culturally connected with Spain, and in the Mediterranean region; with the countries of these two regions, Spain should promote cooperation and development agreements. This should happen also with countries from Asia and Pacific that, in these years, started to increase economic and trade relations with Europe.

After the victory in the general elections and the formation of the Zapatero's Government, one of its first act was related to foreign policy: in April Zapatero formally announced the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq<sup>11</sup> "as soon as possible" not waiting the deadline of June 30<sup>th</sup>, when in the original plan of the Western coalition the political transition of the country should have started.

Informed in a call with Zapatero, US President Bush asked him without success to change his decision and expressed regret for it<sup>12</sup>.

Even during the electoral campaign, Zapatero said that the only acceptable way for PSOE to support the presence of Spanish troops in Iraq was the passage of the mission under the lead of the United Nations.

Iraq was not the only issue in which Zapatero's Government adopted discontinuity in foreign policy, causing tensions with the Populares and with the US: also in the relations with left-wing countries in Latin America such as Cuba and Venezuela, with which Spain in those years started to rebuild diplomatic and cooperative relations.

We could look at this shift as a consequence of what PSOE declared in the electoral campaign, namely giving Spain a new autonomous role in that part of the world, not unconditionally close to the US<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>10</sup> Powell C., (2009) *A second transition, or more of the same? Spanish foreign policy under Zapatero*. South European society and politics, 14(4), 519-536.

<sup>11</sup> [elmundo.es](http://elmundo.es) - Zapatero anuncia la retirada inmediata de las tropas de Irak

<sup>12</sup> [Repubblica.it/esteri](http://Repubblica.it/esteri): Il "no" di Zapatero a Bush "Ritireremo le truppe dall'Iraq"

<sup>13</sup> Spain's Zapatero Emerges as a Bold New Foreign Policy Factor in Latin America – COHA



In these years Spain had an important role during the tensions in Middle East in 2006, when in July Israel attacked the southern part of Lebanon: Zapatero condemned Israeli actions, asking its leaders to respect international laws<sup>14</sup>.

In the same year, Israel invaded the Gaza Strip and after this Spain proposed to France and Italy a peace plan for the region that was composed by five points: an immediate ceasefire; formation of an internationally recognized government of Palestine; an exchange of prisoners; talks between Israel's Prime Minister and the Palestinian president; an international mission in Gaza to monitor a ceasefire<sup>15</sup>. Despite Zapatero counted a lot on this plan, it was opposed by Israel and so it remained theoretical<sup>16</sup>.

There were no other important crises or relevant moments until the end of the legislature in 2008, gained again by Zapatero's PSOE, which obtained 43% of the votes while the PP, led by Mariano Rajoy, obtained 40%<sup>17</sup>.

In the electoral manifesto for the 2008 general elections<sup>18</sup>, differently with the previous one, the first part was dedicated to economic and social issues with foreign and defence policy relegated in the last pages of it.

In the first pages of the manifesto the Socialists made a recap of what they have done in the previous four years of Government, remembering the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and the prominence given to have better relations with EU countries than it was during Aznar's times.

Looking at the final part of the document, the one regarding foreign and defence policy, a lot of importance was given to peace and human rights: PSOE strongly support the proposal of the United Nations of writing a new treaty against the proliferation of landmines and the review of the international norms regarding weapons of mass destruction.

The Party was in favour of the strengthening of the Alliance of Civilizations, proposed by Zapatero and Erdogan in 2005 at the UN General Assembly; this initiative had the aim of promoting dialogue and cooperation between different countries and different cultures, especially after the first years of the new century when a period of clash started between Western countries and Muslim ones.

PSOE was a strong supporter of multilateralism and UN, but it was also in favour of a reform of it which should include the establishment of a Council of Human Rights and changes within the Security Council, increasing non-permanent members and reducing veto power of the permanent ones.

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<sup>14</sup> Zapatero acusa a Israel de no respetar la legalidad internacional con su ofensiva (abc.es)

<sup>15</sup> European states offer Middle East peace plan without UK | World news | The Guardian

<sup>16</sup> BBC NEWS | Middle East | Israel dismisses new peace plan

<sup>17</sup> Resultados Electorales en Total España: Elecciones Generales 2008 | EL PAÍS (elpais.com)

<sup>18</sup> Programa electoral 2008 (psoe.es)

Huge part of the foreign policy section was about the role of the EU, which should be more functioning and relevant not only in economic policies, but also in the social ones increasing the Cohesion policy expenditures, and in the international arena, capable of addressing crises with a unique voice and with the major aim of promote peace and economic development all over the world. According to PSOE, EU member States should become member of a Union for the Mediterranean also with Northern Africa countries, to increase cooperation not only in trade but also for security issues.

On the subject of transatlantic relations, despite some tensions between Zapatero and Bush as we saw before, Spain reaffirmed its commitment within NATO and considered US one of its closest allies. PSOE, despite maintaining a strong Western anchorage, declared that was important to have good relations with developing countries as China, India and Russia, important actors for maintaining a peaceful international orders. Also in this manifesto was underlined the importance of having relations with Latin American countries.

On defence issues, the Socialist Party had three main principles to follow: giving UN prominent role in international peace missions, enhancing the effectiveness of Spanish Armed Forces, and recognizing the role of Parliament in the political debate on this issue.

Looking at the situation on the ground, Spain contributed to missions like the one in Afghanistan, Lebanon and in the Balkans.

After the 2008 general elections, the second – and last – Zapatero’s cabinet remained in office for three years till the end of 2011.

The first challenge faced by the Spanish Government was related to the Kosovo’s declaration of independence, voted on February 2008<sup>19</sup>: Spain was one of the few western countries which didn’t recognize its independence, according to scholars and analysts because of the internal tensions within the central Government and local formation in Catalunya and Basque Country which wanted independence from Spain<sup>20</sup>.

During the first visit to the Spanish troops in the country, the defence minister Carme Chacón announced the withdrawal of them<sup>21</sup> in August; this caused new tensions and disagreements with US administration, with the Department of State that expressed “disappointment”<sup>22</sup>, and with NATO, which Secretary General at that time, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, expressed his concerns about the way Spain announced its decision.

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<sup>19</sup> BBC NEWS | Europe | Kosovo MPs proclaim independence

<sup>20</sup> Ferrero-Turrión R., (2021) *The consequences of state non-recognition: the cases of Spain and Kosovo*, European Politics and Society, 22:3, 347-358

<sup>21</sup> Chacón anuncia la retirada de Kosovo | Noticias de actualidad | EL PAÍS (elpais.com)

<sup>22</sup> Press briefing of Department of State on 20/03/2009

After these harsh reactions from the Allies, the Government announced that the withdrawal from Kosovo would be flexible and in coordination with NATO<sup>23</sup>.

In the foreign policy of the country, 2009 was also important because was the year in which the Lisbon Treaty entered into force: as we saw before, having new good relations with EU and with the most important EU countries such as Germany and France was one of the main aim of Zapatero since his first mandate, so it's not a surprise that under his governments Spain maintained a positive and cooperative attitude towards all the processes of increasing cooperation within the European Union, not only Lisbon but also the unratified Constitutional Treaty of 2004.

Starting from January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2010, Spain took over the Presidency of the EU Council. If we look at the programme presented by Spanish Government, the priorities for the six months Presidency included: “consolidating Europe's social agenda, paying special attention to gender equality and the fight against domestic violence; getting out of the economic crisis; energy security and climate change; creating a safer EU, particularly with regard to the challenge of immigration; and enabling Europe to speak with its own voice on the international scene”<sup>24</sup>.

During this period, Spain organized the first EU-Morocco Summit for the same year to enhance cooperation between the Union and the African country<sup>25</sup>: we could look at this in the context of Spanish commitment towards Mediterranean Area<sup>26</sup>.

It was in this area that in the following year the attention of the world was given, with the Arab springs and the fall of dictators who run their country for decades in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.

Zapatero was the first Western politician that went to Tunisia to express solidarity to the new authorities of the country and welcoming the transition to a more democratic regime; in that visit, the Spanish PM declared that he was in favour of an international humanitarian intervention in response of the possible refugees' crisis<sup>27</sup>.

Also for the situation in Egypt Zapatero, in a note with the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, hoped for a democratic transition to reach in a peaceful way; they also asked authorities of the country to stop using violence against people in the streets who protested against Mubarak's regime<sup>28</sup>.

The most dramatic situation in those months was reached in Libya, where NATO decided to intervene after the approval of the UNSC Resolution 1973 with the operation Unified Protector.

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<sup>23</sup> Press statement by the Presidency of the Government (La Moncloa) on 26/03/2009

<sup>24</sup> Spain takes over EU Council Presidency | News | CORDIS | European Commission (europa.eu)

<sup>25</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20091223042654/http://www.ansamed.info/en/news/ME01.XAM18013.html>

<sup>26</sup> Marquina A., (2011) *La política exterior de España hacia el Mediterráneo en la última década. una evaluación.*

<sup>27</sup> Tunisia, Zapatero a Tunisi: è il primo leader nel Paese dalla caduta di Ben Ali | (blitzquotidiano.it)

<sup>28</sup> Egitto: Merkel e Zapatero, Mubarak fermi le violenze (2) (adnkronos.com)

Spain was one of the countries most involved in military operations, while the Alliance used the military bases of Rota and Moron de la Frontera<sup>29</sup> and Spanish Air and Naval Forces actively participated to the military operations<sup>30</sup>.

The aim of the mission, according to Zapatero, was the protection of Libyan people and coherently with his political view on military operations abroad and multilateralism he decided to support this one only because it followed a UN resolution, otherwise he probably would not have supported it<sup>31</sup>. Six months before the natural end of the legislature, Zapatero resigned because of the economic crisis which had a huge impact in Spain<sup>32</sup>; the general elections were held on November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2011, and as new leader of PSOE was picked Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, Deputy PM of Zapatero since 2010.

In the electoral manifesto for 2011 general elections, huge part was related to economic and social issues because of the economic crisis of the country which was the main concern for both elites and voters; just the last 15 pages of the programme were related to foreign and defence policies issues<sup>33</sup>. Moreover, also in the pages related to foreign policy was given importance to economy: the economic crisis was not just in Spain but also in other EU countries, so in the part related to EU the Socialists stressed the point of the necessity of more coordination between EU and its member States in economic policies, which should not be just monetary but with a look on social reforms.

As for the other programmes we analysed in this thesis, PSOE continued to be in favour of a stronger role for EU in the international arena, welcoming the creation, after the Lisbon Treaty, of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policies and of the European External Action Service and asking for a real and not just formal role of them.

PSOE wanted to promote the creation of a Transatlantic Area of Integration between EU and the US in economic and in security field and, in continuity with its historical position, between EU and Latin America countries, both with single ones and with MERCOSUR.

To increase the *soft power* of the country, PSOE proposed to implement the presence of Cervantes Institutes not only in Latin America but all over the world with the aim of spreading Spanish language and culture.

Also in this manifesto, Socialists reaffirmed the importance of the Alliance of Civilizations and, more in general, of promoting values as peace, democracy and human rights respect; they also stressed

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<sup>29</sup> España intervendrá con cuatro cazas F-18, una fragata F-100, un submarino y un avión de vigilancia marítima | Internacional | EL PAÍS (elpais.com)

<sup>30</sup> Los F-18 españoles están listos para actuar pero aun no han participado en ninguna misión | Internacional | EL PAÍS (elpais.com)

<sup>31</sup> Zapatero seeks support for Libyan intervention | Spain | EL PAÍS English Edition (elpais.com)

<sup>32</sup> [http://archivioistorico.corriere.it/2011/luglio/30/Zapatero\\_cede\\_voto\\_anticipato\\_co\\_9\\_110730004.shtml](http://archivioistorico.corriere.it/2011/luglio/30/Zapatero_cede_voto_anticipato_co_9_110730004.shtml)

<sup>33</sup> Programa Electoral PSOE 2011 (s3c.es)

again the point of better relations with countries of Northern Africa and Middle East, and the centrality of Mediterranean area in Spanish foreign policy.

Finally, on defence issues there are a lot of similarities with the previous electoral manifesto: PSOE supported the participation of Spanish Armed Forces in international missions if these are in the context of multilateral support and authorized by UN; as for the case of Libya, they also supported the concept of Responsibility to protect.

The other issues regarding defence policies are the necessity to reform and modernize Spanish Armed Forces and the support to a general and international plan of disarmament.

In the elections PSOE was badly defeated obtaining only 28% of the votes and returning, after almost 8 years, to opposition while Mariano Rajoy, leader of the centre right Populares, became the new Spanish Prime Minister<sup>34</sup>.

After these elections, for PSOE started a period of crisis which culminated with the European elections of 2014, where the party reached its lowest result (around 23%) and that led to the resignation of Rubalcaba as Secretary general<sup>35</sup>; in the extraordinary congress held in July 2014 Pedro Sanchez was elected as new head of the party<sup>36</sup>.

More in general, we could say that in the second decade of the century not only PSOE, but the entire Spanish politics entered in a period of crisis, with the end of bipolar system and the rise of new political formation: on the extreme right Vox, the liberals of Ciudadanos and the left-wing populists Podemos, which will be analysed in the next paragraph.

The general elections of 2015 were the first in which both PP and PSOE obtained less than 30% of the votes: the Populares were voted by 28% of voters and PSOE reached its worst result ever with only 22% of the votes<sup>37</sup>. No one reached the majority in the Spanish Parliament, so it was necessary to call for new elections that were held in June 2016, but also in this case no party obtained the absolute majority of seats (despite the PP, the first party, gained a higher number of votes)<sup>38</sup>; despite that, Rajoy was able to form a Government thanks to the abstention of the PSOE<sup>39</sup>, decided after the resignation of Sanchez<sup>40</sup>, who wanted to voted against Rajoy's new cabinet but was defeated within the executive organism of the Party.

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<sup>34</sup> <https://resultados.elpais.com/elecciones/2011/generales/congreso/>

<sup>35</sup> Elecciones Europeas 2014: Rubalcaba tira la toalla y convoca en julio un congreso extraordinario tras la debacle | Política | EL PAÍS (elpais.com)

<sup>36</sup> <http://consultasg2014.psoe.es/Result/ResultHome>

<sup>37</sup> <https://resultados.elpais.com/elecciones/2015/generales/congreso/>

<sup>38</sup> <https://resultados.elpais.com/elecciones/2016/generales/congreso/>

<sup>39</sup> El PSOE apoya la abstención para que se pueda formar Gobierno | Política | EL PAÍS (elpais.com)

<sup>40</sup> Pedro Sánchez dimite como secretario general del PSOE | Política | EL PAÍS (elpais.com)

The programmes of 2015<sup>41</sup> and 2016<sup>42</sup> elections were almost the same, and for what concerned foreign and defence policy they were similar to the previous one of 2011.

Firstly, the Party criticized the policies on development cooperation adopted during the years of centre right government, in which according to it the expenditures on that were reduced.

The other two themes on the first part of the programmes were the fight against climate change, for which Socialists hoped for important results during the COP21 held in Paris in the same period, and the refugees' crisis, as they called what happened in the Mediterranean Sea a "humanitarian tragedy". As for the previous manifestos, huge part of foreign policy section was dedicated to the European Union and its importance, according to the Party, for addressing the global challenges like the two mentioned before, climate change and migrations, but also terrorism and equal response to globalization and inequalities.

On defence issues, PSOE manifestos are clear in defining two main threats for peace and security: Daesh and the presence of frozen conflicts in Europe and in the Mediterranean area, which was still a priority for Spanish foreign and defence policy.

In facing those threats was important for PSOE to enhance cooperation within EU creating a real European defence which could act with autonomy but not in contrast with NATO, which remains the cornerstone of collective defence.

The Party supported the Global Coalition formed in those years against Daesh and, for what concerned the most important "frozen" conflict on these years in Eastern Ukraine, it supported the Ukrainian side and their rights of choosing their own international relations with Western countries and IOs but PSOE also stressed the necessity to maintain an open dialogue with Russia to improve relations that, at that moment, were at their lowest level since the end of the Cold War.

After 8 years, it is possible to affirm that the improvement of relations between Russia and Western countries hoped by PSOE wasn't reached.

In the months which followed the 2016 elections the PSOE entered in an internal crisis between the faction loyal to Sanchez, even after his resignation, and the centrist area of the Party led by Susana Díaz. In the congress of the Party, held in 2017, Sanchez defeated Díaz with more than 50% of the votes and took office for the second time as Secretary general of the Party<sup>43</sup>.

In the following months Spain faced a constitutional crisis since on October 1<sup>st</sup> in Catalunya was celebrated a referendum for declaring its independence; the central Government adopted strong

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<sup>41</sup> PSOE\_PROGRAMA ELECTORAL GENERALS 2015

<sup>42</sup> PROGRAMA ELECTORAL 2016 (psoe.es)

<sup>43</sup> Spanish Socialists re-elect Pedro Sánchez to lead party | Spain | The Guardian

measures to block the secession's process and imposed direct rule on the region<sup>44</sup>; in this case, also Socialists senators voted those measures.

One year later, after a corruption scandal which involved some members of the Popular Party, PSOE presented a motion of no confidence for removing Rajoy and replacing him with Sanchez; the motion was approved with 180 yes and 169 no<sup>45</sup>, so on June 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2018, Sanchez became new Spanish PM.

In less than one year, the government was defeated in the Congress so were called general elections for April 2019<sup>46</sup>, in which PSOE returned to be the most voted party of the country, but with only 28% of the votes which means it wasn't possible to form a government unless the Socialists find an agreement with left-wing Podemos, but this didn't happen<sup>47</sup> and the only possibility to resolve the institutional impasse was to held new elections for the following November, the second in the same year and the fourth in four years.

The results of November elections were close to the previous ones<sup>48</sup>: PSOE was the first party but without the absolute majority of seats, but in this case it was possible to reach an agreement with Podemos. Thanks to the PSOE-Podemos alliance and to the abstention, during the confidence vote in the Congress, of the Republican Left of Catalunya Sanchez obtained the majority and was able to led his second government, the first in the history of contemporary democratic Spain supported not just by a single party but by a coalition.

In the electoral programme for both 2019 elections<sup>49</sup>, we find the classical aspects of Socialists foreign policy: support to the EU, multilateralism and spreading values as preservation of peace and human rights: in this manifesto, for the first time, along with "classic" human rights we could find also included rights of women (a huge part of the programme, also for internal policies, is related to feminism) and LGBT communities.

On EU issues, PSOE proposed the creation of an axis with France and Germany to create a more social Europe<sup>50</sup>, with the capability of being an important actor in the global fight against poverty and in development aid.

Other two important issues in which, according to the party, EU must play an important role are climate change and migration crisis.

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<sup>44</sup> Spain's Senate approves powers to remove Catalan government (thelocal.es)

<sup>45</sup> Votaciones de investidura y mociones de censura 1979 - ... (historiaelectoral.com)

<sup>46</sup> <https://resultados.elpais.com/elecciones/2019-28A/generales/congreso/>

<sup>47</sup> Reacciones tras la investidura fallida de Pedro Sánchez | Política | EL PAÍS (elpais.com)

<sup>48</sup> <https://resultados.elpais.com/elecciones/2019/generales/congreso/>

<sup>49</sup> PSOE-programa-electoral-elecciones-generales-28-de-abril-de-2019.pdf

<sup>50</sup> Is interesting to note the absence of Italy, at that time governed by 5 Star Movement and The League

For this last one, PSOE wanted a Europe in which the value of solidarity to these people is mixed with the responsibility to fight against traffickers of humans and to improve cooperation with countries in Africa and Middle East.

This is related to what PSOE wrote in the part related to security policies, focusing on the region of Sahel as it became a priority also for France and Italy in the same period.

For the first time, security policies also included cybersecurity as one of the threats along with terrorism, especially Daesh which was fought by the Global Coalition supported by Spanish Government.

On the conflicts all over the world, PSOE thought that Spain, in the context of EU and multilateral institutions, should be active in promoting political and diplomatic solutions for peace in countries like Syria, Yemen and also for the tensions still ongoing in Eastern Ukraine at that time.

An important novelty is present in the manifesto for what concerned relation between Spain and Latin America countries, especially the ones considered as authoritarian regimes like Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela: the Party hoped to help, in those countries, the political process that could help to start a process of democratization, for the first time the manifesto talked of political prisoners and discriminations against political oppositions.

For the other regions of the world, PSOE clearly stated that was favourable to the international recognition of a Palestinian State and to the right of self-determination of Sahrawi people in Western Sahara.

Furthermore, Socialists proposed the implementation of a “Plan for Africa” to promote, both as Spain and as EU, peace and security in the continent, work with African countries to create favourable conditions to more democratization and a more efficient response to climate change crisis and, finally, to cooperate in addressing the issue of migration.

As we said before, after 2019 elections for the first time was formed not a single party government, but a coalition one; consequently, the electoral manifesto of PSOE was not the programme of the second Sanchez’s cabinet.

This last one was the result of an agreement between Socialists and Podemos, which together wrote the “Progressive coalition agreement”<sup>51</sup>.

In the pages related to foreign policy, the totality of them is about European Union.

The new progressive government should focus on social policies in Europe as, for example, minimum wage and the creation of a new Commissioner for fundamental rights; then other important topics for the new EU would be the creation of a Green New Deal, with new funds for financing ecological

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<sup>51</sup> 30122019-Coalición-progresista.pdf (psoe.es)



policies and of a new Global Pact for Migration, with the respect of values as solidarity and freedom of movement on one hand while on the other one also respecting legality and security.

On the institutional side, the new Spanish Government express its favourability of the reform of voting procedure, with the cancellation of unanimity in the Council.

Finally, the agreement talks of Spain as promoter of new and stronger relations between EU and Latin American countries and with African ones; on security policies it is written in a very general way of more autonomy of EU on this field.

It's interesting to note that issues like transatlantic relations and international military operations were not quoted in this document, probably because those are the ones in which PSOE and Podemos political platforms disagree more, as we will see in the next paragraph.

In these recent years, one Spanish socialist had a prominent role in the foreign policy of the EU: we are talking about Josep Borrell, appointed in 2019 as High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission<sup>52</sup>.

In one of his first speeches, the High Representative addressed the issue of European defence, stated that the common defence policy should be the aim of this European legislature (2019-2024), announcing for the first time that in the following years would be published the Strategic Compass as an instrument for defining threats and how to address them; the final version of this document was published in March 2022<sup>53</sup>, in a context completely changed by Russian invasion of Ukraine.

For Borrell and the EU institutions is very important the threat of cybersecurity<sup>54</sup>, for which was written the "Cybersecurity Strategy".

In this document, cyberspace was defined as a space that offers "great opportunities, but unfortunately, it is also a space where state and non-state actors breach the rule of law, misuse technology to advance their political agendas".

One of the most important things to do, according to EU policymakers, is to define the responsibilities in cyberspace, then strengthen prevention and deterrence in it, establishing a cyber-intelligence working group and increasing cooperation within member States and between external partners.

Related to cyberspace there is another threat: disinformation. This last one became important in the early period of Covid-19 pandemic when according to Borrell "Misleading health information, consumer fraud, cybercrime or targeted disinformation campaigns by foreign actors pose several potential risks to our citizens, their health and their trust in public institutions"<sup>55</sup>.

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<sup>52</sup> Josep Borrell Fontelles | European Commission (europa.eu)

<sup>53</sup> A Strategic Compass for a stronger EU security and defence in the next decade - Consilium (europa.eu)

<sup>54</sup> Cybersecurity strategy: Remarks by HRVP Josep Borrell (europa.eu)

<sup>55</sup> Response to disinformation around COVID-19: HRVP Borrell (europa.eu)

Covid-19 isn't the only crisis faced by Europe in these years; between 2021 and 2022 Russia started to send troops along its borders with Ukraine and, after recognizing the independence of two republics – Donetsk and Lugansk – in the Eastern part of Ukraine, on February 24<sup>th</sup>, 2022, decided to invade the country and started a war that today is still underway.

Since the beginning of hostilities EU, alongside with NATO and G7 countries, takes a clear position in supporting Ukraine and defines Russian aggression as “senseless” and “not only the greatest violation of international law, it is a violation of the basic principles of human co-existence”<sup>56</sup>.

In the first days, Western countries gave unprecedented support Ukraine, for the first time provided weapons to a third country and adopted several packages of sanctions to undermine Russian financial and economic capabilities to finance this war. EU also sanctioned Belarus because of its political and logistic support to Russian Federation<sup>57</sup>.

The positions of EU institutions are the same of the Spanish government: in the first day of war, Pedro Sanchez made a speech in which “condemn the intolerable military actions of the Russian government”<sup>58</sup> and stressed the point of the importance of unity within EU and NATO members and partners.

In April 2022, after the discovery of mass graves in Bucha and Irpin, outside Kyiv, Sanchez was one the first European leaders that talks of signs of possible genocide perpetrated by the Russian military forces<sup>59</sup>.

In late June, Spain hosted the NATO Summit in Madrid, a crucial moment for the Alliance that adopted, in that occasion, its new Strategic Concept<sup>60</sup>, a document that defines the security challenges facing the Alliance and outlines the political and military tasks that NATO will carry out to address them.

In this occasion, that celebrated also the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Spain joining the Alliance, NATO SG Jens Stoltenberg thanked Sanchez's Government for the commitment to transatlantic bond and also for the many contributions that Spain is making to shared security and to collective defence<sup>61</sup>.

For Sanchez, the Summit is important to show the unity of NATO and Western countries for defending democracy and common values, under threat after Russian invasion of Ukraine<sup>62</sup>.

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<sup>56</sup> Statement by HR/VP Borrell (europa.eu)

<sup>57</sup> Press statement by HR/VP Borrell (europa.eu)

<sup>58</sup> <https://euroweeklynews.com/2022/02/24/pedro-sanchez-russia-ukraine/>

<sup>59</sup> Pedro Sánchez sees possible 'genocide' by Russian forces in Ukraine - Spain in English (spainenglish.com)

<sup>60</sup> <https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html>

<sup>61</sup> Joint press point by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the Prime Minister of Spain, Pedro Sánchez on 28/06/2022

<sup>62</sup> The AP Interview: Spain's Sánchez stresses NATO unity

## *BIRTH AND RISE OF PODEMOS*

The economic crisis of 2008-2011 had huge effects in Spain and caused lot of protests organized by a movement called *Indignados*. In the aftermath of these protests, in early 2014 was founded a left-wing populist party called Podemos (We Can)<sup>63</sup>.

Few months after the birth of Podemos, it was voted by 8% of Spanish voters in 2014 European elections and obtained 5 seats in the European Parliament<sup>64</sup>.

The first manifesto of Podemos for these elections contained harsh critics against EU policies, especially the austerity ones; on defence issues, Podemos stated that they rejected military interventions and are in favour of a withdrawal from NATO<sup>65</sup>.

The main issue on this first programme was the necessity to reform democracy in a more direct and popular way, stressing the division – common in populist parties – between people and elites.

One year later, Spain entered in the political crisis and two general elections were held in 2015 and 2016, as we saw in the previous paragraph, because of the results of them in which no one obtained the absolute majority of seats in the Congress.

In 2015, Podemos reached almost 21% of the votes, becoming the third most voted parties and the third biggest parliamentary group<sup>66</sup> but, as we said before, it was necessary to recall new general elections due to the impossibility to form a government.

In the following elections, held in 2016, Podemos decided to form a unitary list with Izquierda Unida (United Left), which in 2015 elections was voted by 3,67% of Spanish voters, called Unidos Podemos<sup>67</sup>.

The coalition obtained around 1 million of votes less than the two former lists in the previous election, but still remained the third most voted list in the country<sup>68</sup>; despite that, Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias was not happy with the results, defined “unsatisfactory”<sup>69</sup>.

The electoral manifesto of Unidos Podemos<sup>70</sup>, for what concerned foreign policy, stressed a lot the necessity of a reform of EU policies, especially economic ones: the main points were the reform of ECB, making more flexible the deficit on debt criteria and the organization of an intergovernmental conference to discuss about the coordinate restructuring of GDP for Eurozone countries.

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<sup>63</sup> Pablo Iglesias prepara su candidatura a las europeas: "Me han pedido que dé el paso" (eldiario.es)

<sup>64</sup> <https://www.historiaelectoral.com/eu2014.html>

<sup>65</sup> The PODEMOS ‘Phenomenon’ and its Manifesto – The Socialist Network

<sup>66</sup> <https://resultados.elpais.com/elecciones/2015/generales/congreso/>

<sup>67</sup> Unidos Podemos, el nombre de la coalición de Podemos e IU | Política | EL PAÍS (elpais.com)

<sup>68</sup> <https://resultados.elpais.com/elecciones/2016/generales/congreso/>

<sup>69</sup> Elecciones Generales 2016: Reacciones de Unidos Podemos (eitb.eus)

<sup>70</sup> Programa electoral de Unidos Podemos 2016 a las elecciones 26-J (20minutos.es)

On EU trade policies, Unidos Podemos stated that it was against the ratification of TTIP and CETA agreements.

The second part of this section was on migration, the main aspect on that was the proposal of closing internment centres for migrants and to facilitate procedures to obtain visas in case of people who escapes from war and who needs to reunite with their family, but also for climate migrants.

In every case, the priority was to assure the respect of human rights in border's control.

Finally, Unidos Podemos declared itself in favour of the recognition of Palestine as a state and of the self-determination right for Sahrawi people in Western Sahara; on development cooperation, the list proposed to rise the funds of GDP to 0,7%.

There was no part of the programme related to defence issues and transatlantic relations, despite the previous programmes of both Podemos and IU were similar.

After 2016 elections, Unidos Podemos voted against the confidence vote that, at the beginning of the legislature, let Rajoy became again Prime Minister. On the contrary, in 2018 the parliamentary group voted in favour of the no-confidence vote that caused the nomination of Pedro Sanchez, leader of the PSOE, as new Prime Minister; Unidos Podemos provided external support to the first Sanchez's cabinet.

In 2019 there were two general elections, the first in April and the second in November; in both, Unidos Podemos – which changed its name in Unidas Podemos – faced an important loss of support. In April, Unidas Podemos was voted by 14% of voters and was overcome by Ciudadanos for the third place<sup>71</sup>; in November, the list obtained less than 13% and, despite the collapse of Ciudadanos, remained the fourth list because the third most voted one became the post-franchist and far-right Vox<sup>72</sup>.

The role of Unidas Podemos was crucial in the development of the 4-months long XIII legislature of the Spanish Parliament because, despite were open negotiations between the list and the Socialist Party, it wasn't found an agreement within these two groups and so, after Sanchez's losses in two confidence votes, the Cortes generals were dissolved<sup>73</sup>.

After autumn elections, the two main forces of Spanish left tried again to open talks and, by the end of the year, reached an agreement – the one we talked about in the previous paragraph<sup>74</sup> – and formed a majority, the first multi-party one in modern Spain, that supported the second government led by Pedro Sanchez.

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<sup>71</sup> <https://resultados.elpais.com/elecciones/2019-28A/generales/congreso/>

<sup>72</sup> <https://resultados.elpais.com/elecciones/2019/generales/congreso/>

<sup>73</sup> El próximo martes se pone fin a la legislatura más corta de la democracia (telemadrid.es)

<sup>74</sup> 30122019-Coalición-progresista.pdf (psoe.es)

The electoral manifesto of Unidas Podemos was the same for both April and November 2019 elections<sup>75</sup>; in these cases, foreign and defence policies didn't have so much space but were relegated in the section called "Democratic and citizens' assurances" which also comprehended institutional internal reforms. The main priorities of the electoral programme were climate change, welfare policies and civil rights.

On defence issues, Unidas Podemos proposed a shift from NATO to EU common defence policy, for what concerns the priorities and the context of international alliances; generally, the rhetoric of the left-wing list was strongly pacifist: in the manifesto there was the call for nuclear and drones' disarmament.

They also stressed the necessity to reform the UN institutions, especially the Security Council in a more democratic way – even if it wasn't explained how – and the creation of a global Parliamentary Assembly to address global challenges.

As for the previous programmes (the one of 2015 and 2016), Unidas Podemos declared itself against trade agreements like TTIP and CETA and in favour of the recognition of a Palestinian State and to the right of self-determination of Sahrawi people.

Then, finally, an important part of this section of the manifesto was related to migration policies, which for both national and EU level should follow the values of solidarity and respect of human rights; and particular attention would be given for refugees, not only in their "classic" definition but, for Unidas Podemos, also for climate migrants and LGBT+ people who are discriminated in their country. An ambitious plan was reaching of zero deaths in the Mediterranean Sea, implementing rescue operations in the area.

In early 2022, foreign policy agenda was all about rising tensions between Russia and Ukraine and, in Spain, this led to disagreements within coalitions' partners: those started already in January, when PSOE asked Podemos to act in a proper way and to not undermine relations within the Country and NATO<sup>76</sup>.

After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, PSOE leader and Spanish PM Sanchez was one of the first European leader in favour of sending weapons to Ukrainian people for defending themselves; Unidas Podemos's spokesperson in the Congress, Pablo Echenique, declared that it is "a mistake" that will only "escalate the war"<sup>77</sup>.

Ione Belarra, Minister of social rights and leader of the party, describes PSOE as "party of the war"<sup>78</sup>.

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<sup>75</sup> Podemos\_programa\_generales\_28A.pdf

<sup>76</sup> Spanish government asks coalition partner not to undermine relations with NATO – EURACTIV.com

<sup>77</sup> Spanish coalition split over decision to deliver weapons to Ukraine – EURACTIV.com

<sup>78</sup> La guerre en Ukraine fracture le gouvernement espagnol – Libération (liberation.fr)

In April, Podemos organized a conference to present a document called “Peace Now”, in which they clearly talk about the Russian invasion, but they also declare that for a long and strong peace not only Russian troops should be retired, but Ukraine must remain a neutral country and not join NATO, one the motivation used by Russian President to justify the invasion<sup>79</sup>.

Apart from the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, which was the main topic in European public debate for months, if we look at the electoral manifestos of Podemos and at the formation of Sanchez second government, it is possible to say that, for this party, foreign and defence policy issues are less important than others as social rights and climate change: for what concerns the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, until July 2021 the Minister was Arancha González Laya, an independent nominated by PSOE; since then the Minister is José Manuel Albares, member of the Socialist Party.

Also for Ministry of Defence was appointed an independent but chosen by PSOE: Margarita Robles. In this, it is possible to see some similarities with what was analysed in the previous chapter for Italy: even there, when were formed leftist coalition government, foreign affairs and defence ministers were chosen from the moderate parties of the coalition.

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<sup>79</sup> Podemos se desmarca de la cumbre de la OTAN promovida por Sánchez y pide sustituirla por una cumbre por la paz | España | EL PAÍS (elpais.com)

*VOTES IN THE SPANISH PARLIAMENT ON NATO MISSIONS. ANALYSIS BASED  
ON TYPE OF MISSION AND GOVERNMENT-OPPOSITION DYNAMICS*

In this paragraph there will be an analysis on how left-wing parties in Spain voted military operations. This analysis is focused on parliamentary votes in the period after 2001 and it only look at NATO missions; for every vote, it is going to be underlined the type of mission, if left-wing parties support the government or if they're opposition and, finally, if we're in presence of a key vote<sup>80</sup> or not. For this research are used the official documents and websites of Congress of Deputies and the Parliamentary Deployment Votes Database<sup>81</sup>.

2006:

ISAF<sup>82</sup> – 11/05/2006 – Government: Zapatero I – key vote: NO – Yes: 283 No: 6 Abstentions: 2  
Authorisation to the increasing of troops for ISAF mission.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
IU	No	x	2	x
PSOE	Yes	166	1	x

2007:

\*ISAF<sup>83</sup> – 25/09/2007 – Government: Zapatero I – key vote: NO – Yes: 34 No: 1 Abstentions: 0  
Authorisation to the deployment of two equipments for the training of Afghan Armed Forces.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
IU	No	x	1	x
PSOE	Yes	23	x	x

2008:

\*ISAF<sup>84</sup> – 28/03/2008 – Government: Zapatero I – key vote: NO – Yes: 45 No: 3 Abstentions: 1  
Agreement to deploy the necessary troops to operate unmanned aerial vehicles in the ISAF mission.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
IU	No	x	1	x
PSOE	Yes	23	x	x

<sup>80</sup> Is defined "key vote" the first approval of troops deployment

<sup>81</sup> <http://deploymentvotewatch.eu>

<sup>82</sup> [https://www.congreso.es/public\\_oficiales/L8/CONG/DS/PL/PL\\_175.PDF](https://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L8/CONG/DS/PL/PL_175.PDF)

<sup>83</sup> [https://www.congreso.es/public\\_oficiales/L8/CONG/DS/CO/CO\\_893.PDF#page=2](https://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L8/CONG/DS/CO/CO_893.PDF#page=2)

<sup>84</sup> [https://www.congreso.es/public\\_oficiales/L8/CONG/DS/PL/PL\\_314.PDF](https://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L8/CONG/DS/PL/PL_314.PDF)

2009:

\*ISAF<sup>85</sup> – 17/06/2009 – Government: Zapatero II – key vote: NO – Yes: 32 No: 1 Abstentions: 0

Authorisation to the increasing of troops for ISAF mission

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
IU	No	x	1	x
PSOE	Yes	32	x	x

\*ISAF<sup>86</sup> – 23/09/2009 – Government: Zapatero II – key vote: NO – Yes: 37 No: 1 Abstentions: 0

Authorisation to the increasing of troops for ISAF mission

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
IU	No	x	1	x
PSOE	Yes	32	x	x

2010:

\*ISAF<sup>87</sup> – 17/02/2010 – Government: Zapatero II – key vote: NO – Yes: 35 No: 1 Abstentions: 0

Authorisation to the increasing of troops for ISAF mission

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
IU	No	x	1	x
PSOE	Yes	32	x	x

2011:

Unified Protector<sup>88</sup> – 22/03/2011 – Government: Zapatero II – key vote: YES – Yes: 336 No: 3 Abstentions: 1

NATO military operation in Lybia enforcing UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973 in the context of Lybian Civil War.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
IU	No	2	1	x
PSOE	Yes	165	x	x

<sup>85</sup> [https://www.congreso.es/public\\_oficiales/L9/CONG/DS/CO/CO\\_310.PDF#page=2](https://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L9/CONG/DS/CO/CO_310.PDF#page=2)

<sup>86</sup> [https://www.congreso.es/public\\_oficiales/L9/CONG/DS/CO/CO\\_347.PDF#page=2](https://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L9/CONG/DS/CO/CO_347.PDF#page=2)

<sup>87</sup> [https://www.congreso.es/public\\_oficiales/L9/CONG/DS/CO/CO\\_468.PDF#page=2](https://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L9/CONG/DS/CO/CO_468.PDF#page=2)

<sup>88</sup> <https://www.congreso.es/votoplenoh/L9/20110322001.pdf>



2014:

Resolute Support<sup>89</sup> – 18/12/2014 – Government: Rajoy I – key vote: YES – Yes: 308 No: 11  
Abstentions: 5

Vote to authorise the participation of Spanish Armed Forces to Resolute Support mission.

Parl. group	Govt. supporter	YES	NO	ABS
IU	No	x	8	x
PSOE	No	103	x	x

The votes signed with \* are made in the Parliamentary Defence Committee and not in the Plenary of the Congress.

For what concerns these votes, the number of Socialists MPs written in the tables is the totality of PSOE members of the Committee, since the entire group expressed a favourable vote, but it was not possible to find the exact number of presences and absences.

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<sup>89</sup> <https://www.congreso.es/en/opendata/votaciones?sesion=236&votacion=50&legislatura=10>

## CONCLUSIONS

At the end of this thesis, it is time to look for the answers to the two questions we made in the first pages:

*How did the centre-left and left parties in Italy and Spain vote for international missions in the post 9/11 global scenario?*

*Are the positions of these parties changed according to the type of mission and to being in government or opposition?*

Since military operations are instruments of foreign policy, it was important to analyse official documents of the parties to see if their foreign policy, during these two decades, changed and if there were similarities or differences between the parties of the two countries.

For what concerns centre-left, in Spain the only party which represents – and represented in the past – this area is the PSOE; in Italy, since 2007 there is a unique party (PD) but for the first years analysed in the thesis there were two: the Left Democrats, member of PSE, and the Daisy, member of the European liberals; despite these parties were autonomous, for the elections they always presented a common programme for the Italian centre-left coalition, called firstly L’Ulivo and then L’Unione.

There are similarities in the manifestos of centre-left formations regarding the issues of foreign and defence policies, the most important are the support to the European integration, also in the field of security, and to multilateralism; furthermore, both PSOE and Italian centre-left were, in 2003, against the Iraq war launched by the Bush administration and both expressed their doubts and concerns about the so called “pre-emptive war” doctrine followed by the US-led coalition at that time.

Because of the geographical position of Italy and Spain, there are attention and interest towards the Mediterranean Area, even if that was historically a priority for Spain while Italy increased its interest for this only in the last few years, after the White Book of Defence published in 2015 by the centre-left government led by Matteo Renzi, in which for the first time we found the notion of “Enlarged Mediterranean”, as we saw in the second chapter.

One of the differences between Spanish and Italian centre-left was the importance given to Latin America, for cultural and historical reasons always present in PSOE programmes but not present in L’Ulivo/L’Unione/PD ones except for some specific issues as, for example, trade agreements.

About the radical left parties, even in this case in Italy there were huge transformations in the party system, passing from the existence of two strong communist parties (PRC and PdCI) to electoral lists that were not able to gain sufficient votes as La Sinistra L’Arcobaleno, and other minor formations as SEL, Art. 1 and The Greens; on the contrary, in Spain in the last decades there was a single party for the left (IU), which is now in coalition with Podemos, populist leftist party born in 2014.

The programmes of the radical left in both Italy and Spain were closer and very coherent with the historical legacies of European left in these fields: in every manifesto analysed here there was a strong call to issues like pacifism and disarmament, even criticizing the international position of the countries, the alliance with the US – especially after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq – and the Atlantic Alliance.

Looking at the votes on NATO missions in the period from 2001 to 2021, for what concerns Italy we analysed 47 votes (5 of them were key votes). Here comes the percentage of support showed by every parliamentary group, dividing when they were government’s supporter or not:

Parl. group	Votes when the group was government’s supporter	Percentage of “YES” votes	Votes when the group was not government’s supporter	Percentage of “YES” votes
Greens/FdV (2001 – 2006/2007)	3	100%	//	//
PDS/DS (2001/2005)	1	100%	9	61,10%
Daisy (2001/2005)	//	//	9	73,30%
PdCI (2001/2008)	4	71,15%	9	17,31%
PRC (2001/2008)	3	64,81%	10	0%
IdV (2006/2013)	3	100%	10	10,89%
PD (2006/2021)	27	99,37%	10	74,24%
SEL (2013/2018)	//	//	19	12,93%
Art. 1 (2017/2018)	//	//	13	41,38%
LeU (2019/2021)	3	77,27%	2	52%

On the other hand, for what concerns Spain, we analysed 8 votes on NATO missions (2 of them were key votes). Here comes the percentage of support showed by every parliamentary group, dividing when they were government's supporter or not:

Parl. group	Votes when the group was government's supporter	Percentage of "YES" votes	Votes when the group was not government's supporter	Percentage of "YES" votes
IU	//	//	8	11,11%
PSOE	7	99,78%	1	100%

In both countries, there is evidence of confirmation for the so called "curvilinear model": according to that, the support of military operations increases as the party is more moderate and decreases – especially for left-wing parties – as the party is more radical.

The main parties of centre-left and members of PES, PSOE and PD, expressed more than 99% of votes in favour when they're part of the government but their support on missions do not decline even if they're, at the time of the votes, minority. For the Italian democrats, this evidence is in line with the behaviour of the two parties existing before 2007, DS and Daisy.

The parties on the extreme left, members of the Party of the European Left, when they're opposition (always in the case of IU and often in the case of PRC and PdCI), expressed very low support to NATO mission, between 10% and 17%; this changed when they started to be part of the government: despite a lower support if compared with moderate parties and despite their rhetoric against war and the imperialism of the Atlantic Alliance, they expressed around 65/70% of yes votes.

An interest case is the case of IdV, the party with the major gap of yes votes using the government/opposition driver: 100% of yes votes when at government, only 10% of yes votes when at opposition; is important to notice that, differently from PdCI and PRC, in some voting sessions (missions' renewals of 2009 and 2010) this party didn't vote against but the totality of it abstained from voting.

The division government/opposition is impossible to use for parties such Art. 1 and SEL, always members of opposition: in this case, we could use different drivers to understand why they voted in favour respectively 41% and 12% of the times as, for example, the type of mission: for "operative" missions as Sea Guardian, Joint Enterprise, Air Surveillance and Resolute Support they voted against while for training and support to local forces missions, as the one in Afghanistan, they voted in favour.

In conclusion, the possible answer to the questions of the thesis is that there are differences in how Spanish and Italian left-wing parties voted NATO missions over the past 20 years; in line with the curvilinear model, the more the party is close to the centre, the more it voted in favour of military operations; to the second question, there are evidences of changes in the behaviour of the parties we analysed according to these two drivers: the support is in average higher when a party sustained the government and the type of mission is also relevant, especially for leftist parties, more willing to support non-combat operations rather than combat ones.

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